The remarks followed Somalia’s recent signing of a tripartite deal with Eritrea and Egypt during a meeting in Asmara, where both Asmara and Cairo affirmed their commitment to respecting Mogadishu’s sovereignty, contrasting with Addis Ababa’s actions in violating it through a naval base agreement with the separatist northern region of Somaliland. 

In earlier statements, Egyptian officials asserted that the purpose of deploying troops to Somalia was to assist the country in defending itself against internal threats from militant groups and external encroachments on its sovereignty, particularly from its neighbor Ethiopia, although they refrained from explicitly naming Ethiopia. 

What does Egypt truly intend by asserting its commitment to impose Somalia’s will over its sovereign territory?  

"In plain terms Egypt threatening Somaliland, saying it would impose naval blockade if Hargeisa goes ahead and implements MoU with Ethiopia,” says Rashid Abdi, a specialist in Horn of Africa regional political and security affairs with Sahan Research. 

 He added that this could be a trigger point for "new Horn war.” 

While Egypt perceives Ethiopia’s construction of a naval base along the Red Sea coast of Somaliland as a security threat to its vital Suez Canal, particularly amid ongoing tensions over the Nile dam project on the Blue Nile River, Cairo is likely to extend its efforts to counter Ethiopia’s influence beyond Somaliland, employing all available means to mitigate it across the borders of the Federal Republic of Somalia. 

Egypt’s anticipated deployment of troops to Somalia coincides with a period of significant tension between the federal government and three regional states—Southwest, Puntland, and Jubaland—each of which is resisting federal directives on critical issues and pursuing independent electoral processes without the consent of Mogadishu. 

For nearly a decade, Mogadishu has sought to assert its authority over federal member states by removing incumbent leaders, a challenge complicated by the federal government’s limited security reach across the country; thus, the Egyptian Foreign Minister’s remarks suggest that Cairo is prepared to collaborate with Mogadishu to rein in defiant regional leaders, potentially employing tactics similar to those used by Ethiopia in support of former President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo against his adversaries. 

If reports of Egypt’s deployment of special forces in and around Mogadishu are accurate, Cairo is expected to assist the federal government in exiling opposition leaders from the powerful Hawiye clan, thereby undermining their ability to mount challenges against incumbent President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who has recently implied a strategy of disarming his opponents through nighttime raids on their residences in the capital. 

As opposition leaders accuse President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of attempting to extend his term, the strategic deployment of Egyptian forces in and around Mogadishu is likely to assist him in countering military figures such as General Saney Abdulle, who has previously mobilized troops to the capital in 2021 and 2017 to demand immediate elections; reports also suggest that Mohamud is currently preparing hundreds of troops in Mogadishu to expel Abdulle’s militias from the city’s outskirts, amid concerns that Abdulle may align with opposition leader Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, who is poised to challenge the incumbent in the 2026 elections. 

Key opposition figures contend that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has embraced authoritarian tendencies since his re-election in 2022, despite campaigning on a platform of openness, democracy, and the protection of rights; they assert that Eritrea’s authoritarian leader, Isaias Afwerki, has influenced him, teaching him to emulate his decades-long iron-fisted rule with little dissent. They also note that Afwerki similarly swayed former President Farmajo, who had promised universal suffrage, transparency, and rule of law during his 2017 campaign. For many observers, Mohamud’s alignment with dictators Afwerki and Egypt’s el-Sisi—evident in a recent tripartite agreement—signals a troubling trajectory that could lead to regrettable erosion of public trust and good governance, potentially paving the way for political uncertainty and prolonged bickering throughout the country. 

In summary, pressing questions remain whether Egyptian troops will help Somalia in defending itself against Ethiopia, engage in combating the resilient Al-Shabaab insurgency—an Al-Qaeda affiliate that has eluded defeat despite more than a decade-long presence of a strong African Union peacekeeping force with support from the United States, the United Nations, the United Kingdom and other western powers —or seek to impose the federal government’s authority over Somaliland, or help oust state presidents opposed to the central government; experts warn that foreign troops may struggle to accomplish even one of these complex tasks, emphasizing that it is ultimately the Somali forces who must undertake this heavy lifting, a view that diverges from the reassuring narratives of government supporters and affiliated media.