
At the beginning of this year 2013, Professor
Lidwien Kapteijns, who teaches history at Wellesley college in the United
States, published a book titled, “Clan cleansing
in Somalia: the ruinous legacy of 1991.” The book’s publication coincided
with the release of spiteful YouTube on an inaugural
commemoration ceremony with the same title, held in Toronto, Canada on January
28, 2013, by members of Darod clan Diaspora and with the publication of a
rabble-rousing interviewwith the author in the WardheerNews Website.
The
book became a reference for attacking President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud for his
appeal to all Somalis to forgive and not dwell on the past and concentrate on
the future for the interest of the present and future generations. Moreover, after
years of reconciliation, the public discourse among Somalis degenerated into
clan fervor, antagonism, self-importance and derogatory tones. These
developments persuaded me to read the book and assess its contribution. Below is
my brief commentary.
The
book inspires hatreds, persecution and virulent campaign of deprecation aimed
at Hawiye clan as a result of deliberate
misrepresentation of the whole truth of 1991 civil war in Somalia. It cancels
out the efforts of thirteen years of reconciliation and peace processes for
restoring national unity, shared governance and prosperity among the wonderful
but abused people of Somalia. Finally, it undercuts the planned opportunity for
exploring the contested history of the past through the constitutional Truth
and Reconciliation Commission (Article 111I ) agreed upon by all Somalis.
The book which comprises
308 pages divided into an introduction, four chapters and bibliography peddles genocide
(clan cleansing) allegation against
Hawiye clan (USC), feeds the conspiracy of Irirism (Hawiye and Isaq alliance) and
stokes Darod rage and grievance for revenge opportunity. The author argues that “Hawiye
(USC) - aided and abated by Isaq- adopted a policy that defined as mortal enemy
all Somalis encompassed by the genealogical construct of Darod clan and
targeted for elimination and expulsion from Mogadishu, central and southern
Somalia during the period between January 28, 1991 and December 1992.” It concludes with the gloomy assertion, “publicly
largely unacknowledged and scholarly largely ignored, the legacy of clan
cleansing continues to undermine the unity with which Somalis [Darod clan]
might resist those [Hawiye clan] who benefit from continued violence and civil
war. This is a crucial area of drift sand in which attempts at social
reconstruction continue to founder.”
As the author claims, the
basis of the adopted policy is that Hawiye clan has been brainwashed by the
myth of associating Darod clan with the regime of Mohamed Siad Barre, Darod
leader, as well as by a “minted” hate narrative against Darod clan. The
assumption here is that enemy clan construct mentality originates from and ends
with Hawiye clan.
Using
computer terminology —“Key Shift”, a modifier for letters into capital, professor
Lidwien argues that the following three observations explain the change of the
civil war definition into genocide definition:
Although
the tales in the book do not fit to its emotive title, the author insists with
arbitary interpretation that the following theoretical definition of Alexander
Laban Hinton on genocide is applicable to the events of 1991:
v Those cases in which a perpetrator group attempts, intentionally
and over a sustained period of time, to annihilate another social or political
community from the face of the earth. (p.5)
For
clarification purpose, there is difference between “civil war” and “genocide (clan
cleansing).” According to Stathis N. Kalyvas analysis, in the case of civil
war, rival factions intend to control rather than eliminate the enemy’s
constituency from the existing or new state. The political and social interactions
from January 1991 refute the fallacious allegation of clan cleansing in
Somalia. Nevertheless, the author decided to first incriminate Hawiye and Isaq clans
and then to ask the whole truth later.
Against
the recognition that “political violence targeting civilians on the basis of
their clan background has deep historical roots and common practice as
technology of power in Somalia”, professor Lidwien had became fixated on 1991-1992
period of the continuum century history of clan based political violence in
Somalia probably for name recognition over its polemical argument with the renowned
scholar I.M. Lewis as laid out in her article, I.M. Lewis and Somali clanship: A critique.
She uses the slogan, “to problematize, periodize and document” 1991
period. No
other scholar, researcher, practitioner, politician, diplomat, and human rights
expert has found any evidence for genocide in the last 23 years. The reading of the
following statement in the book should prompt everyone to question the
motive(s), and judgement of the author:
The most discouraging discovery I
made during the research for this book was how divergent and even diametrically
opposed the memories and interpretations of what happened in 1991 are among what were then (and in some
ways still are) the different Somali parties to the conflict. In other words,
the mythical clan hate narratives are alive and well and continue to underline
and shape Somali political and social realities. (p 233)
In addition to the factual errors, the selective narratives,
contradictions and confusions rife in the book are probably attributable to the
author’s impulsive dismissal of the theoretical framework of balanced clan
identity approach as an important analytical tool for the civil war in Somalia.For
example, professor Lidwien uses the word “absentee” for Hawiye members who fled
their houses in Galkaio district after being attacked, killed and expelled by
their Darod clan neighbors in 1989 while she describes the “absentees” of Darod
in Mogadishu as “genocide.”
Another major blunder of the author is the omission
of checking the reliability and motivations of the notorious “clannish fanatics
and beneficiaries of nepotism” listed as her source of information. The use of
fictional stories is not adequate for historical proof.
The
author utterly failed to see the inteconnected relationships, consequences and
realities produced by the civil war events that took place between December
1990 and December 1992, and then to establish the relationship of that period
with the pre-1990 or post 1992 historical events. It did not occur to the
author to consider the existence of security dilemma and political power
struggle between Hawiye and Darod as clans in the wake of the civil war
outbreak in Mogadishu. Barry R. Posen explained in his seminal paper the
dreadful consequence of “security dilemma” condition in time of ethnic (clan)
conflict. Practically, the author disregarded her ethical obligations as a historian
and researcher and chose to play the role of an “angry prosecutor/judge”
against “presumed guilty defendant” without court rules.
Professor
Lidwien Kapteijns scanned the political violence which took place in many parts
of Somalia before January 26, 1991-the day president Mohamed Siad fled
Mogadishu- with distorted conclusions. Ironically, she equates the policies of Mohamed
Siad Barre regime and the SNM (Isaq) leaders whom she blames for provoking the
government forces in the urban areas. In her “Irirism” conspiracy, the author
ignored to examine the harmonious cooperation between Dhulbahante and
Warsangeli of Darod subclans and Isaq clan in 1991.
There
is no dispute about the physical and human destruction, the traumatic experience
suffered by members of Darod clan in 1991 as result of the civil war. Allah
said: “And fear the Fitnah (affliction and trial, etc.)
which affects not in particular (only) those of you who do wrong (but it may
afflict all the good and the bad people), and know that Allah is Severe in
punishment.” (8:25). But, genocide claim
borders to blind megalomania and malevolent intent.
Throughout
the book, the author castigates all international diplomats, poets and singers,
politicians, anthropologists, journalists, scholars, researchers, human rights
practitioners, and activists, who studied, commented, or wrote about Somalia
for their “cowardice” of not catching and publicizing the 1991 genocide campaign
perpetrated against Darod clan. The poets of the poems reviewed in the first
chapter of her book, and the authors- General Jama Mohamed Qalib, Hussein Adam
Tanzania, I. M. Lewis, Rakiya Oomar, and many others are in the castigation
list. The only exception is Mohamoud Togane who received praise for composing his
satirical poems of Hawiye and Darod clan hate narratives against each other.
But the hate narrative against Darod clan served the scope of the author.
Nevertheless, some of the historical facts in the
book are sufficient to disprove author’s fallacious argument of genocide (clan
cleansing). The first exhibit is the self-explanatory Manifesto document[2]signed by 114 leaders from all clans. Hawiye leaders played a leading role in
the Manifesto civil action. The next exhibit is the extraordinary efforts of Somali
leaders like Hashi Wehelie, Haji Muse Boqor, Mohamed Said Gentleman, Engineer
Jirde, Haji Ahmed Rage, Osman Gedi Rage and others who foresaw the disastrous
consequences of civil war in Mogadishu and courageously tried to the best of
their ability to avoid it. Unfortunately, those leaders paid their lives
because a mortar shell launched from the presidential palace Villa Somalia killed Hashi Wehelie, Haji Muse
Boqor and others and seriously wounded many others. This incident foiled the
prospect for a political compromise.
Additionally,
as confirmed by many sources, Hawiye (USC) leaders in Mogadishu desperately wanted
to prevent the war in Mogadishu. For whatever reasons, late General Mohamed
Farah Aidid had planned and advocated first for attrition confrontation against
the government forces in Mogadishu and then for a disciplined controlled confrontation
if necessary. But the spontaneous popular uprising in Mogadishu provoked by the
nightly mass executions and looting committed by Mohamed Siad Barre and Mohamed
Said Morgan forces in the face of traumatized Hawiye leadership had catapulted
everyone in disarray. The elements of civil
war were in place before december 1990.
Around
January 3, 1991, Western diplomats appealed to the opposing forces for a cease
fire to allow the civilians to leave
Mogadishu. Majority of Mogadishu residents left their houses in the first two
weeks of the conflict.
Astonishingly,
the author accuses all Hawiye clan including those who she describes sneeringly
“so called Hawiye moderates” as accomplices of genocide against Darod clan. In particular, Hawiye prominent personalities
whose reputations are ruined include former father of the Somali Republic
president Adan Abdulle Osman (puh), former President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and his wife
Nurta Haji (puh), Dr Hussein Bod (puh), General Mohamed Nur Galal, Col. Abshir
Kahiye (puh), Adv. Hassan Dhimbil Warsame, and Ambassador Ahmed Mohamed Hassan
Darman (puh).
Professor
Lidwien smears former President Aden Abdulle Osman, whose beloved wife-first
lady was from Darod clan, for his appeal to the public on Radio Mogadishu for
peace and order in the following statement:
Calling of
armed rebels and other citizens to fight mercilessly against what he called “a
few disgruntled elements bent on killing people for clannish motives,” he too
spoke largely in euphemistic terms.
It
is unconscionable to associate president Adan Adde with euphemism and
dishonesty behavior. His efforts were part of a larger peace efforts on the
part of Hawiye clan leaders to stop the mayhem of the civil war.
It
is a malicious lie to write in the book that General Galal supervised the
killing of soldiers in Jigjiga, Ethiopia. Also, it is not true that he controlled
any militia let alone 1,500. Militia clans were independent forces sharing only
common security dilemma. The Italian diplomat, Claudio Pacifico, wrote in his
memoir- Somalia- Ricordi di un Mal
D’Africa Italiano (1994) that from the first day of uprising on December
29, 1990, it was clear to all that no one had control over the volunteer
fighters in Mogadishu (p. 386).
Although
he was a marginalized high-ranking military officer, General Galal did not join
opposition factions. When the war
started, he confidently remained in his
house near the Ministry of Defense until the forces of President Mohamed Siad
Barre visited him for reconnaissance mission on January 2, 1991. Few hours later,
the forces came back, ransacked the house, and tortured members of his family
for his whereabouts. At that moment, he was hiding nearby former deputy
minister house and in the night fall he moved to the Hawiye controlled side of
Mogadishu. This is when he decided to offer his military skill to the
opposition forces for his survival. This confirms what Claudio Pacifico stated
in his memoir but professor Lidwien decided to disregard the truth.
Parenthetically,
without proof, the author accuses the Italian diplomat Pacifico for pro Hawiye.
This partly reveals her frame of mind in studying the history of Somalia.
Another Hawiye leader being blemished in the book
is Adv. Hassan Dhimbil Warsame who is a successful businessman, a lawyer, and
one of the signatories of Manifesto. His mother is from Darod clan. He agrees
that many members of Darod clan as many non-Darod clans suffered violence at
the height of the civil war. But he categorically rejects the baseless
accusation made by Abdulaziz Nur Hersi against him. According to Adv. Hassan, the
truth about the specific incident is that Abdullahi Holif (puh), Abdulhamid
Islan Farah, Abdullahi Matukade (puh) and other SSDF (Darod) leaders were holding
a meeting in a house in an area later taken over by USC (Hawiye) fighters. When
Hassan heard the capture of SSDF (Darod) leaders, he rushed to the frontline house
of the divided city of Mogadishu at his own risk to rescue his maternal uncles and
close friends and to secure their freedom and safety. He fortunately succeeded.
The elders witnessed the tense and dangerous confrontation for their unconditional
release. Hassan is disappointed about the shameful narrative attributed to his maternal
uncles by Abdiaziz Nur Hersi. He is looking forward to getting out the truth.
It is worthwhile mentioning here that an act
similar to what Adv Hassan Dhimbil did in Mogadishu was done by SSDF (Darod)
leaders like General Mohamed Abshir Muse in Kismaio.
Dr.
Mohamed Ahmed Darman, who passed away last year (puh), became ambassador of Somalia
to Tanzania, Ethiopia and China and Consul General to New York and Yemen (Aden).
He never became ambassador to Iran. He ran for parliamentary seat in 1963. He
served his country and people honorably. The northeast coastal communities of
Somalia, travelers and Somali residents in Aden were particularly grateful for
his exceptional service and support during his assignment in Aden, Yemen. His
family’s disappointment is that although Dr. Darman had deep knowledge about
the events discussed in the book and lived in America, the author never
attempted to contact and ask him for truth. This is another example of the
one-sided source of the book.
Clan enslavement in Somalia
Apparently,
Professor Lidwien Kapteijns had restricted her contacts to limited number of
Somali friends so that she finds hard to understand the complexities and dynamics of
clan conflicts, politics and mistrusts. Professor Said Sh Samater offers simple
truth to professor Lidwien Kapteijns: Somali clanism
is a force in the land to be reckoned with.[3]
The
author accuses of hypocrisy the honest, well respected public servant and
freedom activist late Col Abshir Kahiye (puh). The following three stories could shed light on some aspects of
those complexities of clan enslavement.The first story is recounted by former US Ambassador, Peter Bridges, to
Somalia in 1984-1986 in his book, the Safirka (the ambassador) (2000):
I made few Somali friends
I felt I could trust completely. This was a police state, and I had to assume
that what I said would reach Siad Barre. There were exceptions, one of them a well-placed
man who came, like Siad Barre himself, from the largest family of clans, the Darod. My friend was part of a small circle of well-placed
Darod people who as the president was informed, met to discuss ways to advance
particular Darod interests. (p.135)
The second story is told
by late Boqor Abdullahi Boqor Muse to Michael Maren who transcribed in his
book, “The road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International
Charity (1997).”
One time was punishment
for something his father did. Abdullahi Boqor explained: “in 1983 Siyad called the
Harti (Majerteen, Dhulbahante, Warsangeli subclans) elders together at villa Somalia in Mogadishuand told them about a plan for Darod to control the country. “If you put
half a million Ogaadeen in Beledweyne the Hawaadle will be a minority,” he told
them. It was his plan to move the Ogaadeen into all the strategic areas. The
Warsangeli and Dhulbahante agreed to go alongwith Siyaad, but my father
refused. “He refused because the Majerteen are friends with the Hawiye. We do
business with them. The Warsangeli and Dhulbahante
don’t have anything to do with the Hawiye. My father had many meetings with the
elders of the Hawiye. He wasn’t going to betray them.”
Michael
Maren who worked in the Beletweyne Refugee camp pointed out that Abdullahi
Boqor’s brief explanation showed him how the events placed into motion thirteen
years earlier (1981) resulted in the present chaos in Somalia. One should trace
the result further afield, but professor Kapteijns had fixed target.
The
third story is reported by the Italian diplomat Claudio Pacifico in his memoir
(1994):
In the unleashed final bloodshed battle, it has been returned, as in any
tribal (clan) war, to the principle of looting the properties of the enemy. As
a result, the government forces and supporters took vengeance in looting the
local population (Hawia and Rer Hamar) whom they considered to be at war with,
while they had gladly spared or did not loot the houses of westerners
(foreigners). (p.401)
At the outbreak of the civil war in Mogadishu,
government officials from Hawiye clan living in areas controlled by the forces of
President Mohamed Siad Barre were attacked and looted. Others faced the threat of
being killed if they remain in their houses. That is why Hussein Kulmiye Afrah,
Abdulqasim Salad Hassan and Abdullahi Addow fled their houses and sought refuge
in the Hawiye controlled area for their survival. General Mohamed Ali Samater
and other Ministers left Mogadishu in the first or second week of war. The
opposition was delighted to see the crumbling of the government.
Correspondingly,
Darod officals in Hawiye area were targeted by Hawiye fighters. That is why the
jailer and the jailed[4]or the torturer and the tortured[5]of Darod clan were comfortable of being together and organizing military and
political fight against Hawiye and other clans. This explains the clan logic. The
clan identity which is double edged sword is permanent. Allah says, “O mankind! We created you froma single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes,
that ye may know each other (not that ye may despise (each other). Verily the
most honoured of you in the sight of God is (he who is) the most righteous of
you. And God has full knowledge and is well acquainted (with all things).”
(49:13)
The book is toxic and deserves collective
denunciation. It does not help the interest of Somalia. The conclusion of the
book is against Somali culture and Islamic values. It stokes long term memories
of reciprocal hatred, contention and vendetta for colossal mistakes made
collectively and individuals in the past.The past serves lesson for the future.
Repair of civil war comes through truth and reconciliation process. Not
repeatng past injustices is key to better future.
When injustices replace justices, anarchy replaces
order, then clan logic and institutions dominate social relation and replace
state mediation. The best way to address the Somali problem is to adhere to
Allah’s commandment: ““And obey Allah and His Messenger, and do not
dispute (with one another) lest you lose courage and your strength depart, and
be patient. Surely, Allah is with those who are As-Sabirin (the patient ones, etc.).” (8:46).
FairCompetition between individuals and
groups must be differentiated from injustice, abuse of political power, nepotism,
favoritism and corruption. Somali clans share common destiny.
Mr.
Mohamud M Uluso
[1]The list of political and military organizations formed by major clans before 1991:
1.Majerten: Somali Salvation Democratic
Front (SSDF)
2.Isaq: Somali National Movement (SNM)
3.Hawiye: Somali United Congress (USC)
4.Ogaden: Somali Patriotic Movement (SMP)
5.Digil and Mirifle: Somali Democratic
Movement (SDM)
6.Gadabursi: Somali Democratic Alliance
(SDA)
7.Marehan: Somali National Front (SNF)
8.Bantu: Somali African Muki
Organization (SAMO)
9.Dhulbahante and Warsangeli: United
Somali Party (USP)
10. Lelkase:
Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU)
11. Isse:
United Somali Front (USF)
12. Benadiri
Baravani: Somali National Union (SNU)
13. Dir
:Southern Somali National Movement (SSNM)
[2] http://www.biyokulule.com/Somali%20Manifesto%20I.htm
[3] http://www.wardheernews.com/tribute-to-the-mighty-genius-of-somali-clanism/
[4]Abdirizak Jurile and
Mohamud Jama Dhigic Dhigic
[5]General Gani and
Boqor Abdullahi Boqor Muse
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Clan cleansing in Somalia: Fallacious argument by reckless author
The second story is told by late Boqor Abdullahi Boqor Muse to Michael Maren who transcribed in his book, “The road to Hell: The Ravaging Effects of Foreign Aid and International Charity (1997).”