Do you know "other faces" of Al-Qa'ida militants

UKfs Arabic Al-hayat newspaper releases itfs "Final Part: Sidelined from the war in Afghanistan, Al-Qa'ida leads a battle for the Globalization of Jihad from Waziristan."] Sunatimes translated for it's English speakers.

The last series starts with as follows:

The last five parts of this series have attempted to present an image of Al-Qa'idah different from the one perceived by many people, whether supporters or opponents. From the very beginning, the goal of these articles has been to identify the features of the "other face" of Usama Bin-Ladin's organization and how it conducts its "global war" on the West, headed by the United States; and to understand how years of relentless manhunts have affected the organization.

The series has primarily relied on information from the Libyan Islamist leader Mr Nu'man Bin-'Uthman, his familiarity with Al-Qa'idah commanders, and his ties with numerous major actors on the jihadist scene. He has not concealed that fact that he holds Usama Bin-Ladin's organization responsible for the multitude of calamites that have befallen the Islamic nation, as well as the distorted image of Islam, particularly in the West. Bin-'Uthman, the former Libyan Fighting Group commander and, presently, an analyst at the British counter-extremism foundation Quilliam, has disclosed parts of what he knows about the "Al-Qa'idah's secrets." He believes that by divulging these secrets, he is providing an opportunity to those who support the "absurd wars of Al-Qa'idah," to reconsider their viewpoint after becoming aware of the realities inside the organization. He asserts that these are not secrets anymore and that the western security officials are acquainted with much more than just this information. In his opinion, what Al-Qa'idah does is not jihad and he wants to explain this to everyone who would like to understand it. Hence, the idea of the "Al Hayat" series on the "other face" of Al-Qa'idah emerged.

Until now, the series has exposed that Al-Qa'idah had not been completely aware of the consequences of its actions on September 11 2001, and that Al-Qa'idah's leadership had gone through with the New York and Washington Campaign despite the overwhelming opposition from the Taleban leadership. There were also internal disagreements amid the circles of Al-Qa'idah commanders who saw this as an act of disobedience against the instructions of Mullah Omar, to whom Bin-Ladin had supposedly pledged his loyalty and whom he had sworn to "heed and obey." The series has also disclosed that the organization moved forward with its assault even though it knew that it had not yet acquired a deterrent weapon that they imagined would prevent the Americans from attacking Afghanistan. In addition, the series has revealed that Bin-Ladin had miscalculated that Pakistan would not support the Americans against his organization and the Taleban.

It has been clear throughout the series that, in Al-Qa'idah's battles during the US invasion of Afghanistan, the organization failed in the two major battles in which it had engaged in Kandahar and Tora Bora. Al-Qa'idah, at the time, could not provide fighters to defend Kabul despite its promises and that battle was led by other jihadists who were not part of Al-Qa'idah as a result.

The series has also described how the US attack affected the organization and how its leaders were constrained to the Afghan-Pakistan-Iran triangle. Despite this, Al-Qa'idah managed to spread throughout the globe with the help of other jihadist organizations, although Al-Qa'idah itself cannot be credited for their formation. In Iraq, Al-Qa'idah had inherited the Group of Monotheism and Jihad, led by Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi. It benefited from the established networks of the group in its efforts to expand its influence to the rest of the Arab Mashriq [TN: i.e., Arab east] states (Syria, Lebanon and Iraq), and to have a connection with the primary battlefield that is the war with Israel. Al-Qa'idah had also tried to build upon already existing organizations in efforts to extend its influence to the Land of Egypt by commissioning a leader at the Islamic Group to try to establish an Al-Qa'idah branch there. As for the Arab Maghreb [TN: i.e., Arab west], Al-Qa'idah has also succeeded in inheriting a jihadist organization that alr eady existed, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat of Algeria. Al-Qa'idah also managed to attract a wing of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group whose members are essentially operating on the Afghan-Pakistan border areas (In fact, many of them did not have a choice but to join). Al-Qa'idah has also tried to broaden its activities in the Arabian Gulf with Al-Qa'idah in Saudi Arabia, which later became Al-Qa'idah in the Arabian Peninsula. In the African Horn, Al-Qa'idah has pursued extending their influence through an alliance with a Somali group, the Mujahidin Youth Movement. This alliance, however, has not yet led to the official conversion of al-Shabab into a branch of the organization in East Africa. .

As it is clearly presented and illustrated in this series, the complex relationship between Al-Qa'idah and its branches has been unquestionably beneficial to Bin-Ladin's organization. However, it has attracted many complications as well. The greatest advantage might lie in that the branches have helped Al-Qa'idah's leaders to prove that they had succeeded in absorbing the US offensive, and that instead of shrinking and declining it had managed to expand and grow. The disadvantage might lie in that Al-Qa'idah, willingly or unwillingly, was forced to take responsibility for the actions of its branches. For instance, Al-Zarqawi's experiment in Iraq that ranged from: random killings and mass-massacres, to fighting the other (Sunni) resistance groups, to labelling a large section of the society (Rejectionists) disbelievers, were all indicators of the nature of the "Islamic state" that Al-Qa'idah was aspiring to establish in Iraq. In fact, Al-Qa'idah's leadership tried to advise al-Zarqawi repeatedly to soften his approach; without a doubt, it was aware that it was being blamed for the actions of its emir in Iraq. A similar situation transpired with Al-Qa'idah in Saudi Arabia. According to Bin-'Uthman, it became clear to Bin-Ladin that the bombings carried out by his organization in Saudi Arabia had only caused people to detest his practices. He was forced to halt his operations when the security authorities there delivered him a military defeat and cracked down on the majority of his cells. In the Arab Maghreb, the strategies of the "Salafist Group," which became an Al-Qa'idah branch, distanced average people from them, especially when the group carried out bombings at the heart of the capital, spreading terror amidst the populace that had just escaped the blazes of a devastating civil war in the nineties. With the resulting disapproval of the population of Al-Qa'idah's operations in Algeria, the Maghreb branch of the organization was forced to transfer its main activities to the desert coast. It essentially became dependent on the technique of kidnapping western citizens in exchange for ransoms, a practice that, according to many people, does not differ from the actions of organized criminal groups.

In summary, if this was the condition of Al-Qa'idah branches around the world nine years after the 9/11 attacks, then what is the state of Al-Qa'idah command (the mother organization), to whom all of these organizations have promised their allegiance? This is the question that the last segment in this series will address.

To begin with, there is no doubt that since late 2001 Al-Qa'idah has kept its command within the Afghan-Pakistan-Iran triangle, despite the expansion of its branches around the globe. Regardless of the setbacks or the triumphs attained by Al-Qa'idah branches, it is clear that, for the prospective future period, the command has set a multi-objective strategy for itself -different from the strategies of its branches. The first pivotal objective of this strategy, or "vision" as Bin-'Uthman's sees it,-is the "globalization of jihad," demonstrated especially through the myriad of online messages - an instrument that allows the organization to compensate for being unable to communicate directly with its target audience -

posted by Al-Qa'idah leaders and theorists. Bin-'Uthman believes that "al-Qa 'ida does not have a strategy in a military or technical sense. All what it has is a vision, general perceptions, and vague, passing ideas. Until now, Al-Qa'idah has not developed a military strategy to guide the war and the struggle". It should be noted that this strategy is broken down into stages, or temporary objectives, or, what are known as, tactics. But, the most important factor is the ability to implement it on the ground after leveraging all available resources. He adds, "Al-Qa'idah has failed to accomplish this just like all previous jihadist groups."

In fact, it is not clear when Al-Qa'idah command adopted its new vision that Al-Libi [TN: i.e., Bin-'Uthman] has described in detail. It is, however, probable that it will not start arranging its priorities and setting its objectives in accordance with this strategy until the dust of the battles in Afghanistan has settled. In the last nine years, the Taleban has managed to restore its presence at the scene of the conflict after failures during the initial confrontations. With the reappearance of the Taleban, the Arabs [TN: referring to the Arab fighters] started rearranging their lines after their military setback in 2001. They dispersed across the Pakistani tribal areas in particular. Bin-'Uthman explains, "Over the past years after 2001, it has been clear that Al-Qa'idah has succeeded in integrating all the Arabs in Afghanistan into its own organization. It became impossible for any jihad volunteer to join the battlefronts in Afghanistan without being a follower of al-Qai'da. This is very important because efforts to join the front lines in Afghanistan on behalf of Arabs have been notable, especially during the past two years. Al-Qa'idah has now become the only container that can take in the Arabs who come to join the jihad. This gives Al-Qa'idah a more important position in any future dialogue with the Taleban after the dust of the battles settles."

It is also clear that Al-Qa'idah knows that it does not have any military influence over the balance of combating factions inside Afghanistan. The Afghans themselves are doing the fighting against the US forces and the Afghan government. Bin-'Uthman points out, "Al-Qa'idah deems what is currently happening in Afghanistan -clearly stated in their literature and statements -a rebellion against Hamid Karzai's government and the NATO forces. Two parties are carrying out this rebellion: the fighters affiliated directly with the "Islamic emirate" led by the Taleban, and their supporters, fighters launching attacks against the Americans and the Afghan government forces without being directly affiliated with Taleban."

This viewpoint vis-a-vis Afghanistan is entirely distinct from the perspective the Arabs held during the first jihad against the Soviets and the communist government of Najiballah in Kabul. At that time, the Arabs had joined seven Afghan mujahidin factions, and they could be attached to any of these, such as Hekmatyar, Rabbani, and Sayyaf. Now there are only two parties, either the Taleban or the pro-Taleban. This suggests that the Taleban are the insiders, the people with authority and the ones who have the political mandate, while all the others are simply the pro-Taleban. Consequently, any subsequent disputes over authority that might occur after the withdrawal of the foreign forces can be evaded because no one will now contest the Taleban's right to authority. The pro-Taleban always support the people of the land and they cannot dispute them over the control of this land.

Although the Arab fighters are not a key element in the fight in Afghanistan, they do participate in battles on the Taleban fronts. They most likely converge at the Haqqani network regions in the Afghan south east, and not in the southern regions that directly fall under the Quetta shura led by Mullah Omar.

Afghanistan and the Al-Qa'idah Project

Bin-'Uthman thinks that "Al-Qa'idah does not intend to remain in Afghanistan. As is evident throughout their messages, the goal is n ot to establish a state, or emirate or anything alike there. They see themselves in the role of defenders in Afghanistan. They say that the situation in Afghanistan is an occupation, from which they intend to liberate the country. The messages that they discuss -through their branches and organizations - are related mainly to the Arab world and the Middle East." He adds, "Al-Qa'idah has pursued the development of the core of the struggle in which it has been engaged since successfully attracting Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi to its ranks in 2004. During this period, Al-Qa'idah has developed a vision, or a concept, based on the following: there is a need emphasize Al-Qa'idah's presence on the front lines of the Palestinian cause. It is the heart of the conflict in the Middle East and many have criticized Al-Qa'idah -even before 9/11-saying that while Al-Qa'idah talks about Palestine, it takes no actions for this cause. Therefore, Al-Qa'idah's leadership thought that Iraq, after the American invasion in 2003, could be a focal point, allowing Al-Qa'idah to extend its influence to the countries in the region, especially the Arab Mashriq and among Palestinians. At this period, Al-Qa'idah focused on the need to link the events in Iraq to the situation in all of the Levant countries such as Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories. With this connection, Al-Qa'idah could achieve its goal to expand into the Levant, and individuals could be attracted to establish Al-Qa'idah networks in that region." He also adds, "One of the fundamental mistakes that Al-Qa'idah committed to this end, is that the strategy based on the Al-Qa'idah-led jihad in Iraq had passed through a bottleneck and it was impossible to stop. They described the events in Iraq as having "exceeded limits." He quoted one of Al-Qa'idah leaders as saying that "nothing would hinder it" no matter what might happen. However, today the observer of this conclusion knows to what extent Al-Qa'idah had been mistaken. Therefore, its project in the whole region, including Iraq, has failed."

The Libyan Islamist [TN: i.e., Bin-'Uthman] also points out: "Al-Qa'idah did not pay attention to the fact that it had entered the same cycle the national movements had gone through previously - the goal is Palestine. Any speech made by Al-Qa'idah today shall stress that the battles it has fought were for the sake of liberating Palestine. All the fights and efforts to destabilize Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, and other places, they perpetrate in order to be in touch with the Palestinian theatre. Therefore, 'no one should criticize us, or argue against us, or question our work, or any mistake we have made, because this will affect the real battle with the enemy.'"

Security Presence

Since Al-Qa'idah knows that their primary objective is in the Middle East and that their military presence is not significant for the battles in Afghanistan, it has altered the nature of its presence at the Afghan-Pakistan border areas. It has come to represent more a security presence than a military one. It seems that this arrangement is specifically divided between two main areas. One area is inside Afghanistan. Here, most of them are fighters. The second is inside Waziristan, where their presence is for the benefit of the commanders. Al-Qa'idah wants them to be in touch with the outside world through directed internet messages, email communications with other places in the world, phone calls, even written or oral messages sent via messengers who deliver any request. It is no secret that those present in Waziristan are the daily targets of air raids carried out by remotely controlled American drones. Bin-'Uthman thinks that "Al-Qa'idah definitely wants to help these commanders in Waziristan avoid the danger of being consumed by the war in Afghanistan. Perhaps this is because they play an important role in interacting with the media." It is probable that Al-Qa'idah has a network of people who gather information about the events taking place around the world, either through the Internet, newspapers or TV channels. Then they prepare a summary to be reviewed by the organization leaders, who can express their replies or comments.

Bin-'Uthman argues that, "This reflects Al-Qa'idah's awareness that it does not have a military significance in Afghanistan - it is like a drop of water in the sea of the fight waged by Taleban. It would be unable to affect the course of the battle no matter how many men it were to provide. Al-Qa'idah also knows that the focus of its objective -the mission -is not Afghanistan, and never has been. Since the 1990s, Al-Qa'idah has believed that its mission is in the Middle East, not in southern or southeastern Asia, no matter how strong its sympathy with the Muslim cause in this corner of the world." Bin-'Uthman also notes: "The second crucial battle for Al-Qa'idah was against the West, and the Taleban was not a part of it, apart from what the movement considered as a Western occupation of Afghanistan. It is a struggle that will end with the withdrawal of these countries from Afghanistan. Therefore, Al-Qa'idah left a number of its leaders to deal with the media war against the West."

Furthermore, during the past years Al-Qa'idah has developed a system for sending reports to its command, usually located in Waziristan. These reports are related to the field conditions in Afghanistan, and discuss the situation of battles and the role of the Arab fighters, as well as their accomplishments. Although these reports are sent from the command in Pakistan, their authors are on battlefield inside Afghanistan. Their emir was supposedly Mustafa Abu-al-Yazid, who was appointed as the commander of Al-Qa'idah in the Land of Khorasan (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and some parts of Iran) before being killed in a US airstrike earlier this year.

As their commander, Abu-al-Yazid was the person who was meant to be the recipient of these reports from Al-Qa'idah factions on the battlefield in Afghanistan. However, there were indications that these reports were sent instead to other commanders in Waziristan who might be directly in charge of field operations. A report sent from Al-Qa'idah member inside Afghanistan to his command in Waziristan highlighted, "Everyday the situation is better than the day before. Now those who perform and prepare for the operations are the pro-Taleban fighters themselves. Common people are aiding and serving the mujahidin. With the help of the strength of the Taleban and their control over the territories, the people are no longer afraid as before." Although the date of when the report was written is not clear, evidence indicates it may have been sent sometime in 2007. Bin-'Uthman presents another example from a different report that includes a field evaluation of the situation on the ground stating, "I want to bring the good news of the jihad and mujahidin in these areas. There are too many open areas, and the enemy is positioned only at the central areas of provinces and on main roads. Thanks be to God, the morale of the enemy is collapsing day after day. According to what we see and the news that reach us, weakness has started to spread among their troops." The author of the report continues, "I am writing you this report while we prepare to go to the line (i.e., the front). The line is surrounded by the Taleban and their supporters from all directions, while the enemy is in the middle. I toured the line in a complete circle. We did not pass by any area where we did not find Taleban fighters or pro-Talebans."

Another report dating back to the summer of 2008 notes, "(We) found out that the number of pro-Talebans is increasing daily. Common people love the Taleban and seek their counsel in their disputes. The number of young martyrdom-seekers is increasing and they persistently ask to participate in martyrdom operations. They range in age from 15 to 17, and they have a great passion for self-sacrifice." This report also reveals that Al-Qa'idah is not satisfied with merely fighting in Afghanistan but it also seeks to disseminate its Salafist ideologies among the Afghans." The author of the report continues, "We discovered that the Taleban were very organized and communicated with each other from town to town and village to village. There were security guards at the locations that they had seized from the government." "Rewards are increasing day after day, especially those seized from the apostates. We have performed the duty of preaching, thanks to god. When we pass by any mosque we discuss three issues: the importance of monotheism in man's life, requirements for the acceptance of good deeds (sincerity and persistence), as well as the merits of jihad and the obligation of supporting the mujahidin," he adds.

The "Shadow Army" and "Brigade 313"

It should be noted that Al-Qa'idah has established a new body to lead its operations inside and outside Afghanistan, operating from the tribal areas in direct coordination with the Pakistani branch of the Taleban. This body is known as the Shadow Army comprising a number of elements. Most prominent among these is "Brigade 313," which, according to foreign intelligence service investigations, has connections to a number of conspiracies to carry out attacks in some countries around the world. Not much is known about the Shadow Army; however, what is known about Brigade 313 is that it is a congregation of non-Afghan immigrants headed by the Arabs. It emerged as a result of the unification of different groups including the Islamic Jihad Movement, Lashkar -e-Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jeish-e-Muhammad [TN: the Army of Muhammad]. These are all groups that operate actively inside Pakistan and (Kashmir). This Brigade does not only focus on Afghanistan, but also manages the struggle in different areas around the world. According to Bin-'Uthman, a number of jihadist commanders rotated the command and senior responsibilities of these groups even if they had not been Al-Qa'idah members to begin with, but joined Al-Qa'idah after assuming command. Among these were Abu Layth al-Libi, who was killed in Waziristan in January 2008, and 'Abdallah Sa'id al-Libi, who was killed in 2009 in Waziristan as well. Brigade 313 was led by "Ilyas al-Kashmiri," but he was reportedly killed in a US raid in the village of Tori Khel near the village of Mir Ali in northern Waziristan on September 14, 2010. Al-Kashmiri was a former soldier in the Pakistani Special Forces. It is claimed that he was involved in many assassinations or assassination attempts that targeted several Pakistani security commanders. Bin-'Uthman tells that, as a symbol of good fortune, the brigade derives its name from the 313 companions [TN: of Prophet Muhammad] who participated in the Battle of Badr, the first battle after the revelation of Islam.

"The Globalization of Jihad"

Today, it is clear that Al-Qa'idah believes that it is championing an international struggle; it is seeking to globalize its jihad so that it can lead it. According to Bin-'Uthman, this means that "Al-Qa'idah has to rebuild its architecture to be internationally-based; in other words, to be an international organization that knows its environment and how to deal with its reality.

One would be unable to understand this perspective unless one were familiar with how the organization judges itself, and not how it is judged by others." He also highlights that the structure of carrying out this struggle is divided into three main levels:

The first level involves the Al-Qa'idah general command, in accordance with the official title, which is probably located in Waziristan; however, it is spread across the Khorasan areas. This organization is considered to be the heart whose main function is to wage a media war -the battle of ideology. It is the party which controls the rights to publish Al-Qa'idah's message relayed through the commanders and theorists of the organization such as Bin-Ladin, al-Zawahiri, ' Atya 'Abd-al-Rahman and Abu Yahya al-Libi. All of them are directing a global message in the name of Al-Qa'idah, encompassing the most remarkable attitudes of the organization regarding the events that take place, such as the reviews issued by jihadists against the extravagance occurring in the name of Jihad, as well as criticism against the Muslim scholars whom Al-Qa'idah deems opponents of its attitudes and supporters of the governments of their countries. This ideology also includes the most prominent attitudes towards the world's most outstanding issues such as the Palestinian cause (including the validation of Al-Qa'idah's attack on Hamas). Dr Al-Zawahiri has discussed this issue as well as 'Atya 'Abd-al-Rahman who addressed the issue of the Party of Islam in Gaza and Fatah al-Islam in the Levant.

The second level is the regional one, the branches of Al-Qa'idah in the Land of two Rivers [TN: Iraq], Islamic Maghreb, and the Arab Peninsula. There are other branches which have not been completely formed yet, such as Al-Qa'idah in the Land of Egypt, and Al-Qa'idah in the land of Levant [TN: Al-Qa'idah in the Land of Lebanon and Syria]. It also seems that there is ongoing action to settle the relationship between the Mujahidin Youth Movement and Al-Qa'idah, as the Somali movement has announced its allegiance to Al-Qa'idah without becoming an official branch of that organization.

As for the third level, it encompasses Al-Qa'idah supporters around the globe. They move individually or in local cells without having any relationship either with the mother command in Waziristan or Al-Qa'idah branches worldwide. These elements have not officially joined Al-Qa'idah and have not pledged to heed and obey its commander; however, they consistently support the different levels of Al-Qa'idah's war efforts -media, financial and military ones -because they are under the influence of the ideas of this organization. This segment of sympathizers is spread all over the world. Their inexperience with the military issues and not having undergone religious validation, however, might result in their carrying out operations with lamentable consequences. These might be sudden and unplanned but they are seen as having a foundation in martyrdom-seeking operations.

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