By Proff Buubaa

Timelines

· In addition to rampant corruption, debacle of government troops and recurrent political crises which have recently crippled the ability of the Transitional Federal Institutions to carry out its essential tasks, there are yet more prospects for trouble and uncertainty as the timelines which determine the end of the tenure of the President and the Parliament approach in January and August 2011 respectively. 

· There are many political and security challenges that these timelines imply for the proper functioning of the TFG, and without the provision of the required strategy and procedures to manage these challenges, Somalia could very well spin out of control into unchartered crises and possible takeover by Al-Shabab and its international terrorist patron, Al-Qaeda, with serious consequences for regional and international peace and security.

Fundamental Principles

· The political climate in which these timelines are going to be met should, therefore, be characterized by national consciousness, mature responsibility  and resolute calm where national interest overrides clan  and personal interests

· The timeline for the end of the tenure of the President in January 2011, and the timeline for the end of the tenure of the Parliament in August 2011 should remain irrevocable and should not be extended.

Qualified Resolution Council (Ahl Al-hal WA Al-aqd أهل الحل والعقد (  

· A qualified council of 100 members composed of Somali men and women drawn from scholars, professionals and practitioners in political, civil, economic and Islamic affairs and Somali values would convene for 30 to 45 days in one of the peaceful regions of the country such as Somaliland, Puntland and Galmudug, with all necessary preparatory measures and supervisions undertaken by the United Nations, to carry out:

1. Mapping out the structure and basic tasks of a Caretaker Government to replace the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)  and designating the necessary timelines for the executions of these tasks 

2. Selection of members of the Caretaker Government.

· Among the other tasks to be assigned for deliberation by this Council is to prepare workshops on local and regional administration programs for departing members of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) to participate (as agents of change) in preparation for their roles in promoting local governance in their constituencies after August 2011 and until free and fair elections are going to take place in these constituencies at the local and national levels.

Caretaker Government

· A caretaker Government comprising a Prime Minister and a Council of Ministers composed of 19 portfolios shall take over the Executive Branch of Government from the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) within two weeks after the end of the tenure of the President.

· The tenure of the Executive Caretaker Branch of Government shall extend to sixteen (16) months after the end of the tenure of the Transitional Federal Parliament in August 2011.

· The Qualified Resolution Council (Ahl Al-hal WA Al-aqd أهل الحل والعقد (  shall appoint a Judiciary Council composed of qualified judges, among whose functions would be to install and implement an independent functioning judiciary system throughout the regions of the country to bolster governance,.

· The Qualified Resolution Council (Ahl Al-hal WA Al-aqd أهل الحل والعقد (  shall appoint a National Religious Council composed of qualified Muslim scholars who would constitute a consultative body on religious issues to blunt the growth of the ideology of religious extremism and advance moderation and tolerance. 

· The Executive Caretaker Government shall nominate an Independent Election Board before the end of the tenure of the Parliament in August 2011.

· The Executive Caretaker Government shall, within the first thirty days of its tenure, discuss and adopt its Program of Action, including timelines, financial requirements, logistical needs, security assistance for national reconciliation and/or pacification of unfriendly forces, combating extremism and terrorism, extension of security and governance throughout all the regions of the country, carrying out national referendum for the constitution and holding national elections.

· Program of Action of the Caretaker Government should encompass a holistic, National Development Option Strategy to promote the primary objectives of:

1. Strengthening good governance, consolidation of peace and security and improvement of economic performance and development, targeting specifically the peaceful areas of the country such as Somaliland, Puntland and Galmudug and engaging the international community to deliver development assistance to these regions in a manner consistent with national reconciliation and unity

2. Enabling the National Security Forces (NSF) to become a respected institution capable of combating extremist insurgency and maintaining security in Somalia, so that the international community can contribute to invest in its development.

3. The Caretaker Government must adopt and apply a rigorous security strategy, proper vetting procedures and recruitment, professional standards of operation, allegiance to national priorities and balanced composition of the National Security Forces (NSF).

Security Council of UN

· The Caretaker Government requires international legality to function effectively throughout Somalia, and a Security Council Resolution, specifying mandates and political and financial assistance for the  Caretaker Government is a must

· Regional organizations such as the League of Arab States and the African Union should also be authorized by the Security Council Resolution to undertake the rendering of financial (mainly from GCC countries) and security (not including neighboring countries)  to Caretaker Government

· 

UNPOS/International Community

· UNPOS in coordination with the international community should liaison with TFG in meeting timely with the timelines in this proposal.

Significant Background Notes

· The seven-year timeline (August2004 – August 2011) for the endgame of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to restore a central authority in Somalia is fast approaching its dead-end, without any probable prospect in sight for the achievement of the tasks necessary  for the  reemergence of any central authority in Somalia.

· Its transitional predecessor, the Transitional National Government (TNG) (May 2000 – May 2003), likewise failed, during its three year transitional timeline, to achieve the transitional tasks that were required for the reestablishment of the presumed central government in Somalia.

· Both transitional orders were plagued with highly similar predicaments of overwhelming insecurity, rampant corruption and political problems which resulted in both cases in the replacement of the Prime Minister at the least four times in three years, as well as in the bankruptcy of the results expected from the transitional process.

· Amid a host of other factors which have contributed to this predicament and bankruptcy, the two major factors which stand out as the primary culprits which inevitably contributed the most to the hindrance of the achievement of the transitional tasks that were considered necessary for the reemergence of a central authority in Somalia are: 

1. A structural flaw in the composition, interaction and operation of the three basic institutions of the transitional entities, namely the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary branches, rendering them counter-productive and centers for conflict propagation, competing clan agendas, and constant squabbles within and between the leading figures of these institutions. 

2. A  political plunder dubbed  as“ the 4.5 formula” in the clan-centric  power sharing disposition of the transitional process, the intended rationale of which was to arrive at an equitable and legitimate political representation  between feuding Somali clans, but which inevitably turned the transitional parliaments into “a collectivity of mediocrities”, incapable of producing the required leadership and the necessary political vision to translate the transitional tasks into a tangible political framework to usher the reemergence of a central authority in Somalia.

· It was during the convention of the Somali National Peace Conference (SNPC) held in Arta, Djibouti, in April-May 2000 that the first transitional entity, the Transitional National Government (TNG) was established. The conference was aimed at bringing together representatives of the warring clan factions of Somalia to end the civil war that had claimed over hundreds of thousands of lives. Abdiqasim Salad Hassan served as the interim President from August 27, 2000 until October 14, 2004. His transitional regime appointed the following four prime ministers:

1. Ali Khalif Galaydh – 1st  Prime Minister, October 8, 2000–October 28, 2001

2.  Osman Jama Ali – 2nd  Prime Minister, briefly held post October 28–November 12, 2002                                                                      

3. Hassan Abshir Farah – 3rd  Prime Minister, 12 November 2002–December 8, 2003      

4.  MohamedAbdi Yusuf – 4th  Prime Minister, December 31, 2003–November 3, 2004

· After the collapse of Transitional National Government (TNG), the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was formed in November 2004 under the interim presidency of Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed until his resignation in December 29, 2008, adding more chaos to the country's political landscape and preparing for the takeover of feuding Islamist insurgents under the leadership of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the  former Commander in Chief of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU),  in January 31, 2009. The TFG is the current internationally recognized government of the Somalia Republic. It was established as one of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) of government as defined in the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) by the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP). The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has, so far, appointed the following five prime ministers:

1. Ali Mohamed Gedi – 1st  Prime Minister, November 2004 – 29 October 2007

2. Nur Hassan Hussein -  2nd  Prime Minister,  24 November  2007 – 13 February  2009

3. Mohamoud Mohamed Gacmodhere -  3rd  Prime Minister, 16  December 2009 - 24  December  2009

4. Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke – 4th  Prime Minister, 13 February  2009  -  `21 September 2010

5. Mohamed Abdillahi Mohamed “Farmajo” -5th Prime Minister, 31October  2010  -  `Present

· The failure of the Somali state has its roots in the last thirteen years of the Military Dictatorship of the regime of Mohamed Siyad Barre, between July 1977 when Somalia invaded Ethiopia in the ill-fated Ogaden War, and January 1991 when Mohamed Siyad Barre fled Mogadishu and the Hawiye clan-based forces of the United Somali Congress (USC) took over the city.

· It is in this period (1977 – 1991) that Somalia descended into violent clan-centric confrontations and the demise of nationalist sentiment and cohesion. 

· Faced with the stinging defeat of the Ogaden War and an armed resistance organized by important lineages of the Somali kinship groupings aided by Ethiopia, its archenemy, the military regime unleashed a reign of terror and intimidation bordering on genocide on its frightened citizenry. 

· Institutions of governance and rule of law began to atrophy and the army's officer corps was purged of competent career officers on suspicion of insufficient loyalty to the regime, and the brain drain of qualified manpower and flight of entrepreneurs to Europe, North America and the Middle East began to take its toll on the administrative and economic performance of the country.

· Corruption and unaccountability became the order of the day, and ministers and bureaucrats plundered what was left of the national treasury after it had been repeatedly skimmed by the top family members of the regime.

· Insurgent movements with the aim of toppling the Siyad Barre regime at any cost were organized along clan lines, putting Somalia on a trajectory of disintegration into frail clan fiefdoms, and propelling Somali politics into suicidal sub-clan feuds and the derailment of national priorities and vision at the hands of illiterate warlords.