By Prof. Mohamoud Iman Adan- Virginia, USA - Prelude: Again such policy is unpractical and counterproductive. Since early1992, the World has witnessed similar policies advocated and sponsored by UN Security Council, which never got off the ground due to the culture and character of the Somali people. In the other hand, foreign soldiers stationed in hostile ground, like the southern Somalia, are not performing peace keeping duties alone.
Their other priorities include making big backs and protecting
themselves and the military gear under their custody without a second
thought. The order is shoot at real or presumed enemy before a comrade
is harmed. After all, soldiers are trained to over power or kill
opponents. So the epic name of peace keeping doesn't hold water an does
not make any sense to the victimized civilian population. Rather, it is
a commercialized political jargon to mislead the people, just to
solicit financial contributions for Somalia in the name of peace and
development. And the southern regions of Somalia won't buy it.
By
tradition, foreign army stationed in the country is seen a national
threat- a concept embedded in the social values of the people for
centuries. The UN, the East African countries, as well as many Western
Nations do not take this fact into account and avoid to consult with the
tradition of the recipient nation of how they would like to be helped.
Instead, they are shoved foreign forged policies into their throats,
which in most cases, is unpalatable to the taste of the masses.
Regardless
of the will of the conflicted regions, EGAD and UN are fond of
implementing such ineptitude policies and deploying foreign armed forces
in the southern regions of Somalia, a failed one after another. In
doing so, UN has to get prepared to change an old age social perception
that resists intervention of foreign army in their country without their
consent. God knows how long do such policies could work for the UN; but
the local people believe that resisting masses will outlast than any
foreign policy imposed on them. Such unity of purpose has supporting
historical background element, and, perhaps, not taken note by the UN
Security Council. A few example suffice for reckoning the mental frame
of the local people under foreign military threat:
I. Somali
nomads fought a campaign of tug of war with Ethiopian hermit kingdoms.
The long lasting conflict was about land expansion and pasture rights.
Ethiopian farmers retaliated by severing the main tendons of camels'
hind legs-the pride and lifeline treasure of the pastoral Somali
society, just to intimidate the nomads. The conflicting parties had a
different mental frame. The Somali pastorals believed that pasture and
water are the grace of God and no one should claim exclusive ownership
over them. But the Ethiopian farmers believed in land ownership and
opted out to fight such concept; but finally gave up to taking part of
the conflict for so long and settled valley farmlands among higher
plateaus, where livestock could hardly get by. The conflict ended after
the death of Ahmed Gurey, “The left handed pastoral leader,” who led the
resistance. Local historians have it that the conflict era coincided
with the timing of Christoforo Colombo trip on his way to find a short
cut way to the land of spaces in 1492. The pastorals had a purpose of
unity and resisted retaliatory actions of their foes.
II. In
early 19th Century, Italian military contingents made incursions on the
Eastern coast of Somalia only to meet a fierce resistance by Biyamal
warriors that lasted 21 years of bloody skirmishes. The local uprising
held up off shore the invasive enemy for so long and did not capitulate
to the on-slaughtering cannon fire. At the end, the military
stubbornness gave way to subtle diplomacy and the Italian admiralty
negotiated with a policy of peaceful terms of non-interference and
respectable co-existence with the local community. The contingents were
finally allowed to land on shore safe and trustworthy. It was the first
military contingents settled at Shalambot, 60 miles south of Mogadishu
who became the front-runners of the Italian colonization task force in
the Southern Somalia. Take note of the war chronology historic book
titled “ferro e' Fuoco” in East Africa. This is an example of how the
Somalis had always reserved contempt about foreign intrusion into the
country.
III. On the opposite side of Northwest coast of Somalia, the British
army was bogged down by the Dervishes- the horse-bone pastoral warriors-
led by Mohamed Abdulle Hassan- a charismatic local leader who resisted
the invasion of foreign army into the country. The British Foreign
Office wanted meat supplies for its garrison stationed in Aden, south
Yemen and fought the Darvishes to the end by establishing a military
base at Berbera, a seaport at the Red Sea that faces South Yemen.
It
was not an easy walkover as jotted by the British foreign
policy-makers; but turned to become a long war, which had all the
ingredients of pastoral warrior psyche and the military mighty of
British Empire that lasted for 21 bloody years. At the end, the
Dervishes got defeated by the bombardment of RAF, the British Royal Air
Force in early 20th century fought at foreign soil. RAF destroyed the
strongholds of Dervishes at Taleeh and elsewhere, located some 90 miles
Northeast of Berbera; yet no British foot soldier dared to follow the
Dervishes and finish off the retreating warriors for good. The British
aviation technology won the war by using its air force superiority,
which was the last resort for the British army to win a challenging
war.
Those survived dervishes argued that the bombardment was not
one to one man war in the open. Details of the wars are available at
British Military museum in London that could have served a lesson for
the UN Security Council to consult before sending armed contingents into
the country. The net shell of the war engagement revolved on two
clashing factors: The pride of egalitarian pastorals against the
indomitable ego of British army. The Dervishes had this mindset: Who
budges first? Who owns the land in contention? Who has the final say?
Was the outcome of the war worthy of loss of lives, property and human
resources?
IV. In 1964, the Somali nascent army had border
dispute with the impressive Ethiopian army. It took a month to push the
Ethiopian forces back to their bases in Ethiopian heartland and dusted
off their hands. The pastoral army came back home war hardened and
victorious. Again the local forces showed that no foreign army can
invade the country without impunity.
V. In 1977-78, Somalia had
land dispute war with Ethiopia. It was a hard fought war and costly one
for both sides. In three months, the pastoral army routed the Ethiopian
military regiments nicknamed “The Lion of African,” and planted the
national flag some 90 miles East of Addis Abeba, the Capital City of
Ethiopia. In good time, whoever, the military alliance of Ethiopia,
Russia, Cuba and South Yemen helped out the besieged country and
restored the land it had lost, while pushing the Somali army back over
the border line. The war ended but, it increased the enmity of the two
nations- a lingering hard feeling Ethiopia reserves for Somalia until
now.
VI. The Role of UN in Somalia
UN involvement in Somalia has nothing to do with humanitarian
endeavors. Rather, it unmitigated business. As elsewhere in some other
parts of the world, conflicted 3rd world nations create steady jobs for
UN involvement into the internal affairs of their countries. If conflict
trend drops down, there are always subtle ways to strike new grounds
and keeping the momentum; because a world without armed conflicts is a
sure way of ending UN profile in the world. So the survival of UN
Regional Offices in Nairobi, Kenya feed and prosper on human tragedy and
relish to stay on course; but they are not alone. There are hundreds of
Somali political goons who destabilize peace and security of the
southern regions and connect well with UN Regional Officials. They are
accepted as the best buddies of UN Regional services as they are
instrumental of keeping Somalia in turmoil, while keeping UNDP in
business.
This is a fact:.... (
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http://www.keydmedia.net/en/article/article/sending_more_foreign_peacekeeping_forces_to_somalia/Source: keydmedia.net
Somalia: SENDING MORE FOREIGN PEACEKEEPING FORCES TO SOMALIA? (Open Letter to UN & USA)
By Prof. Mohamoud Iman Adan- Virginia, USA - Prelude: Again such policy is unpractical and counterproductive. Since early1992, the World has witnessed similar policies advocated and sponsored by UN Security Council, which never got off the ground due