Press release
Dutch Court of Appeal does not clear Dahabshiil of Terror and Criminal Allegations
- Click here Press release
Dutch Court of Appeal
Journalist Dahir Alasow wins important case for press freedom in Somalia against Dahabshill in Dutch Court of Appeal
- Read more
ALSO IN THE NEWS

Video Villa Somalia terrorists Attack led by Harmuud Telecom Staff

0
Tuesday October 22, 2019 - 05:04:37 in Latest News by Super Admin
  • Visits: 401
  • (Rating 5.0/5 Stars) Total Votes: 1
  • 2 0
  • Share via Social Media

    Video Villa Somalia terrorists Attack led by Harmuud Telecom Staff

    Watch updated News video about the Attackers. The U.S. condemned the Somali presidential palace assault, which underscores the need for continuing support for the Somali National Security Forces and African Union Mission in Somalia, State Departme

    Share on Twitter Share on facebook Share on Digg Share on Stumbleupon Share on Delicious Share on Google Plus

Watch updated News video about the Attackers. The U.S. condemned the Somali presidential palace assault, which underscores the need for continuing support for the Somali National Security Forces and African Union Mission in Somalia, State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said in a diplomatic statement.
The attack appeared to be a repeat of an al-Shabaab assault against the presidential palace in February, because of Hormuud Telecom staff  working inside Presidential palace, Hassan Mohyadin Hassan (Watch Interview Part 1 and part 2).
The report says Mohyadin, a Hormuud Telecommunication technician, had become known in the presidential palace over the last two years but no one suspected him of connection to al-Shabab, which claimed responsibility for the palace attack.
The Geeska Afrika Online reporter in Mogadishu reported that, the Al-Shabaab attackers’ main target was Prime Minister Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed. It said three of the attackers were wearing government uniforms and were armed with AK-47 rifles and hand grenades.
Mohyadin allegedly helped Al-Shabaab assailants pass through several major security checkpoints and get close to the prime minister’s office before security guards intervened and gunfire erupted.
The Somali national TV interview (Part 1 and Part 2) reports that Hormuud telecom Worker had passed information about prayer times in the palace mosque and movements of the Somali defense minister to Al-Shabab. It says he was on the Al-Shabab payroll earning about $200 per month.
The Somali Al-Shabaab militants entered the Presidential palace in Mogadishu before Somali armed forces alongside AMISOM repulsed the attack, killing three of the assailants and injuring another, the leader of the group who is Hassan Mohyadin Hassan the staff of Hormuud Telecom.
The attack bore all the hallmarks of Somalia’s Al-Shabaab militants, who have carried out a string of strikes against the country’s internationally-backed but fragile government.
Witnesses said there was heavy gunfire and several heavy blasts believed to be suicide bombers.
 The attacks have targeted key areas of major offices, or the security forces, in a bid to discredit claims by the authorities that they are winning the war against the Al-Shabaab Islamist fighters.
The Somali-canadian General Abdihakim Said was removed as police commissioner and replaced by Mohamed Sheikh Ismail, Duhulow said, citing a presidential decree. Mohamed Abdullahi Hassan replaced Bashir Mohamed Jama as head of the national security agency, he said.
Khalif Ahmed Ereg, a former national security official in banadir region, was named security minister, taking over from Defense Minister Mohamed Sheikh Hassan who had been in the position on an acting basis since May.Also 1000 Suicide Deadly attack: Hormuud Telecom employee responsible for facilitating passage of company vehicles - UN Report.
Annex 2.2: 14 October attack Timeline of the attack1 c.08:00: The large vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (LVBIED), a Fiat TM truck, departs from Afgoye, Lower Shabelle region. The vehicle is stopped at Sinka Dheere checkpoint at KM12, on the outskirts of Mogadishu. Mukhtar Mohamed Hassan Roble2 — a Hormuud Telecom Somalia Inc. employee responsible for facilitating passage of company vehicles through the Sinka Dheere checkpoint3 — arranges for FGS security forces to allow the vehicle to pass after paying a toll;
The driver passes through Ex-Control Afgoye checkpoint at KM7 using the toll receipt obtained from Sinka Dheere;
The vehicle is stopped at Benadir checkpoint at KM5. For unknown reasons, security forces become suspicious and call for an explosives ordnance disposal (EOD) team to inspect the truck. The driver speeds off and is pursued by traffic police;
15:24: The LVBIED detonates next to the Safari Hotel at Zoobe junction, approximately 450 m from Benadir checkpoint;
16:10: A Toyota Noah VBIED parked in Wadajir district, approximately 1.5 km south-west of Zoobe junction, arouses the suspicions of a local shop owner and is approached by National Security and Intelligence Agency (NISA) officers. The officers search the vehicle and arrest the driver, Hassan Adan Isaq a.k.a. Abdinasir Jeeri;
16:30: The second VBIED is remotely detonated, killing one civilian and injuring four others.
Key members of the plot
A high-ranking Al-Shabaab Amniyat operative, Hassan Adan Isaq a.k.a. Abdinasir Jeeri, aged 23, was prosecuted and subsequently sentenced to death for his role in the operation. Isaq had been tasked with coordinating the deployment of a second VBIED, a Toyota Noah minivan, that was likely intended to breach the perimetre of the airport complex in order to clear a path for the principal LVBIED. According to FGS investigators, Isaq had served as a driver for Al-Shabaab emir Ahmed Diriye, while the latter was governor (wali) of Bay and Bakool regions around 2010.4 Isaq was later a subordinate to "Fanax” (a.k.a. Gardhuub, Ali Dhere, and Gees Adde), a senior Amniyat leader specializing in explosives, in Bardera, Gedo region. Adan appeared to have held a relatively senior position in Al- Shabaab given his age of 23; he reported during interrogations that he "grew up with Al- Shabaab”, having been recruited in 2009, at around the age of 14.5
Two employees of the principal Somali telecommunications provider Hormuud Telecom Somalia Inc. were also prosecuted in connection to the attack, for facilitating the entry of the LVBIED through the Sinka Dheere checkpoint. One of these individuals, Abdiweli Ahmed Diriye, had telephoned Mukhtar Roble, the second Hormuud employee, and instructed him to arrange to speak to FGS security forces in order to convince them to allow the LVBIED to pass through Sinka Dheere.6 Diriye was tried and subsequently sentenced
__________________
1 This timeline has been primarily sourced from UNMAS Somalia’s report on the 14 October incident, "Report on the VBIED attacks in Mogadishu on 14 October 2017,” compiled 14-28 October 2017.
2 Roble was arrested but later acquitted due to lack of evidence.
3 FGS military court document, on file with the Secretariat.
4 Ibid.
5 Interview with the FGS investigating officer in Mogadishu, 20 March 2018. 6 FGS military court document.
18-16126
75/156
to a three-year prison term, while Roble was acquitted. Diriye’s uncle, Abdullahi Ibrahim Hassan Absuge, the owner of the Fiat TM truck used for the LVBIED, was sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment.
According to court documents, a man known only by the name "Duale” acted as a logistics officer for Isaq once he had arrived in Mogadishu.7 "Duale” drove Isaq around Mogadishu in a tuk-tuk in order to conduct reconnaissance. He showed Isaq the NISA checkpoint at KM4, proximate to the Mogadishu airport complex, and explained that Isaq’s role would be to conduct the driver of the second VBIED to the checkpoint, where it would subsequently be detonated to clear a path for the LVBIED.8
"Duale” told Isaq that he was a member of the FGS, and showed Government ID to pass through the checkpoints;9 according to the FGS investigating officer, "Duale” was likely a member of NISA, due to his ability to pass through Government checkpoints unchallenged in a tuk-tuk.10 "Duale” told Isaq that he had coordinated previous major attacks in Mogadishu, including the complex attacks on the Ambassador Hotel (1 June 2016) and the Nasa Hablod Hotel (25 June 2016).11 As of this writing, "Duale” was still at large.
LVBIED size and composition
An assessment of the LVBIED suggests a TNT equivalence of upwards of 1,200 kg, making it likely the largest explosive device in Al-Shabaab’s history.12 An independent explosives engineer consulted by the SEMG used a range of explosive engineering formulae and tools to estimate the explosive mass of the VBIED. Explosive engineering software was used to conduct the analysis, using input parameters which included the damage radius from satellite imagery, the type of surface, as well as crater dimensions of the blast. UNMAS Somalia, conversely, concluded that the net explosive quantity (NEQ) of the blast was approximately between 600 kg and 1,000 KG (TNT equivalence).13 The agency took into account the complexities of all the unknown variables; the exact explosive used, including modifications or adulteration, the construction of the buildings, and anomalies due to blast overpressure. According to UNMAS, a nearby lorry transporting sugar may have acted as a fuel enhancement for the blast, contributing the widespread fires in the vicinity and augmenting the death toll.14
Experts in Mogadishu who conducted field tests of the explosive material suggested the presence of both military grade explosives and the oxidizer potassium nitrate, suggesting that Al-Shabaab may have attempted to bulk up the LVBIED using home-made explosives (HME) components.15 Constructing a 1,200 kg LVBIED by traditional explosive remnants of war (ERW) harvesting would entail a major logistical operation; for example,
__________________
The vehicle was known to FGS security forces, as the driver established a routine by frequently traversing the Sinka Dheere checkpoint, in preparation for the day of the attack. It is not clear why the driver was held up at the checkpoint by FGS security forces on 14 October. Interview with EOD specialists in Mogadishu, 20 February 2018.
7 FGS military court document.
 8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Interview with the FGS investigating officer in Mogadishu, 20 March 2018. See annex 4.2 (strictly confidential) for additional information regarding the infiltration of NISA by Al-Shabaab. 11 FGS military court document.
12 The same expert had estimated the LVIED deployed at the Medina gate in Mogadishu on 2 January 2017, hitherto Al-Shabaab’s largest IED, at approximately 1,200 kg (see S/2017/924, para. 12). Both estimates were peer reviewed and agreed by a UK-based blast analysis engineer. 13 UNMAS Somalia, "Report on the VBIED Attacks in Mogadishu On 14 October 2017”, October 2017.
14 Ibid. UNMAS teams deployed to the scene to conduct a post-blast investigation reported the area being covered in a sticky black residue that smelled of caramel.
15 Interview with an EOD specialist in Mogadishu, 20 February 2018. However, the field test kits used by EOD teams are not as accurate as laboratory analyses.
S/2018/1002
 Al-Shabaab would have had to harvest approximately 6,000 60-mm mortars or 190 TM 57 anti-tank mines.16
Figure 1: CCTV footage of the detonation of the LVBIED.




Leave a comment

  Tip

  Tip

  Tip

  Tip

  Tip


Copyright © 2009 - 2019 Sunatimes News Agency All Rights Reserved.
Home | About Us | Diinta | Reports | Latest News | Featured Items | Articles | Suna Radio | Suna TV | Contact Us