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From Cold War Era to War on Terror

by Mohamed A. Mohamed 

01 June 2009

A thesis submitted to the Faculty

of the Graduate School of the State University

at Buffalo in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree

Master of Arts

Department of American Studies

"I object to violence because when it appears to do good, the good is

only temporary; the evil it does is permanent."

Mahatma Gandhi

Table of Contents

Abstract iii

Chapter 1 Introduction 1

Dynamics of Clanship in Somali Society 1

European Colonial Rule 3

Chapter 2 U.S. Strategic Interest in Somalia during the Cold War Era 7

U.S. and Soviet Union in Somalia 7

The Rise of Warlord Phenomena in Somalia 14

U.S. Support for Somali Warlords 16

Chapter 3 Global War on Terror - Post 911 24

The Rise of Islamic Movement in Horn of Africa 24

The Role of Ethiopia in Somalia 34

Conflicts within Somali Government 47

Chapter 4 Failed U.S. Policy in Somalia 67

Bibliography 78

ii

Abstract

This thesis examines United States¡¯ policy toward Somalia from the era of the Cold War

to that of the more recent and ongoing War on Terror. It asserts that U.S.¡¯s change of policy from Cold War alliance with Somalia to the use of Somalia as a battleground in the War on Terror has resulted in a disorganized and disjointed policy framework. In 1991, an alliance of warlords defeated President Siad Barre¡¯s regime that supplied Somalia¡¯s last central government and that was allied to the US. Subsequently, the victorious warlords turned on one another, resulting in clan feuds that destabilized the Somali state. In March 1994, this chaos engulfed US troops engaged in a humanitarian mission, resulting in the death and humiliation of several American soldiers in the so-called Black Hawk Disaster that led to the withdrawal of US troops and interests from Somalia. However, following the events of September 11, 2001, in which Islamic extremists attacked the Twin Towers in New York City and the ensuing launching of War on Terror, the United States became suspicious that Somalia was now a breeding ground for terrorist attacks against American interests in East Africa. This threat increased when Islamic Court Union (ICU) consolidated its power in southern Somalia after defeating US-allied warlords in June 2006. The ICU did bring a respite of law and peace for some six months, following fifteen years of warfare and chaos. But this was short-lived. Armed with economic and political support from Washington, neighboring Ethiopia invaded southern Somalia and occupied Somalia¡¯s capital, Mogadishu, under the pretext of the War on Terror. As many as 1 million people are reported to have been displaced and more than 10,000 were estimated to have been killed in Mogadishu.

iii

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Dynamics of Clanship in Somali Society It is imperative to understand Somali history, society, and culture in order to evaluate U.S- Somali relations during the Cold War and War on Terror. Somalia is located in the Horn of Africa, adjacent to the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Peninsula. Historically, it was similar to numerous cultures in and around the region. For example, in ancient times, the Egyptians glorified Somalia as a "God¡¯s Land" (the Land of Punt);1 Greek merchants who traveled on Red Sea called it the "Land of Blacks." Arab neighbors used to refer to this land as Berberi. German scholars observed that the Samaal people, who give Somalia its name, inhabited and occupied the whole Horn of Africa as early as 100 A.D.2 This theory diverges from the popular myth that the Somali people (also known as Samaale or Samaal) originated from Arab roots.3 Indeed, historians and archeologists have revealed that Somalis share language, traditions, and culture with Eastern Cushitic genealogical groups.4 The Eastern Cushitic ethnic sub-family includes: the Oromo, most populated ethnic group in Ethiopia; the Afar people who inhabited between Ethiopia and Djibouti; the Beja tribes of Eastern Sudan; and the Boni tribes of Northeastern Kenya. In other words, modern Somalis are richly embedded in African culture.5

 1 Jacquetta Hawkes, Pharaohs of Egypt (New York: American Heritage, 1965), 27.

2 Helen Chapin Metz, ed. Somalia: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division Library of Congress, 1992), 5

3 Ali Ahmed, The Invention of Somalia (New Jersey: The Red Sea Press, 1995), 5.

4 Lee Cassanelli, The Shaping of Somali Society: Reconstructing the History of a Pastoral People (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania , 1982), 23

5 B. Lynch & L. Robins, New Archaeological Evidence from North-West Kenya. (Cambridge University Press, 1979), 320.

The four major tribes of Somali lineage are nomadic and pastoral: Dir, Darood, Isaaq, and Hawiye. These nomad tribes constitute around 70 percent of the Somali population.

The two smaller agricultural tribes ¨C Digil and Rahanweyn ¨C make up only 20 percent, while 10 percent of the population is comprised of coastal dwellers whose economy is based on fishing and farming. It is imperative to understand the role and history of clan politics and how it developed over the centuries to shape the modern government in Somalia. Traditionally, nomadic society mastered the art of forming alliances to protect the interests of kingship and ensure water and grazing land. Rainfall, in particular, is very critical to the life of pastoral communities. It is the main factor that forces them to compete with other tribes and to move from one inhospitable place to another. Although they expect two rainy seasons, some localities never see one drop of rain and experience severe droughts, costing nomads most of their livestock. In the 20th century, there were six harsh droughts across several regions of Somalia that lasted more than two years and produced famine.6

6 I. M. Lewis, Brief descriptions of the major Somali drought in the 20th Century, including that of 1973 -

75, can found in Abaar: The Somali Drought. (London, 1975) pp. 1-2, 11-14.

7 While anthropologists might use tribe and clan in different terms, in Somali language, both (clan-family and tribe) mean the same. Tribal elders play an important role in the process of securing water. They make the final decisions in waging war and making peace with other neighboring tribes and relocating

clan-families to new territories.7 Tribal elders sit on the council of leadership that administers most clan affairs, down to relatively small matters, like marriage arrangements within the clan-family. The relationship between different tribes always depends on how tribal elders manage conflicts and enforce previous agreements.

However, an agreement might not last long. Therefore, it is the role of elders to find some sort of resolution to crises before things get out of hand and an endless cycle of revenge ensues. It must be said that these tumultuous situations and conflicts are positive in that they cement together clan-families against the threat presented by other tribes.

This is necessary, as with political circumstances shifting continuously, it is hard to predict when another skirmish or war might take place. Yet, insecurity and suspicion within the clan remains high where negotiation and conflict resolution are not possible.

In his book, Lee V. Cassanelli summarizes Somali clan politics by translating Somali proverb:

I and my clan against the world

I and my brother against the clan

I against my brother8

European Colonial Rule ¡¡

8 Cassanelli, 21

Over the centuries, the Somali people have demonstrated, as part of their tradition, a

vigorous independence and unwillingness to surrender to a single political authority.

Clan leaders never quite had the authority to enforce rules on all people; rather, their role

was to remind people of the importance of strong clan consciousness, stressing ancestral

pride, as the clan has been the integral part to their survival and existence since ancient

times.

It is important to discuss the reaction of Somali nomadic society to the European-

introduced modern Somali state. A clash of cultures invariably resulted from different

conceptions of law as it relates to the person. The European concept sees the state as

responsible for individual rights; inherently, it does not recognize the nomadic system of

justice, based on collective responsibility. Over the centuries, the Somali coastal area has

entertained various outside rulers, including the Omanis, the Zanzibaris, the Sharifs of

Mukha in present day Yemen, and the Ottoman Turks. One thing these rulers had in

common was that they did not disturb the nomadic lifestyle or interfere in their clan-

family politics, because they knew Somalis were used to being ungoverned and therefore

suspicious of foreigners. However, everything changed when the Somali Peninsula and

East Africa were dragged out of relative isolation into world politics. This was only the

start of the imperial epoch. In 1885, rival European powers ¨C Great Britain, France, and

Italy ¨C divided amongst themselves land populated by the Somali ethnic group in the

Horn of Africa.9 This territory was essentially ruled by clans until Great Britain took the

northern territory near the Red Sea, close to its other colonies in Aden; while the least-

experienced European colonies, Italy, was granted Southern Somaliland. The French took

hold of what is today known as Djibouti, a tiny nation on Red Sea. Ethiopia also grabbed

a chunk of Somali land called the Ogaden (see Figure 1 & 2).

¡¡

9 Scott Peterson, Me Against my Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda (London: Routledge,

2000), 11

FIGURE 1: Political Map of Africa10 FIGURE 2: Map of Somalia and

10 World Atlas. Retrieved April 20 2009, from http://www.world-atlas.us/africa-map.gif

11 US Politics. Retrieved April 21 2009, from http://www.uspolitics.about.com

12 Cassanelli, 148

13 Abdi Sheik-Abdi, Somali Nationalism: Its Origin and Future. (England: Cambridge University Press,

1977), 658

http://www.world-atlas.us/africa-map.gif

http://www.1001arabian.net/somalia/somalia-map.gif

Neighboring Countries11

The British and Italians had different strategies and interests in Somalia. Britain was

interested in Northern Somalia, mainly as source of livestock for its colony in Aden,12 its

principal supply route to Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal. British occupied Aden in

1839. Italians, on the other hand, wanted crops in the form of plantation agriculture:

bananas, sugarcane, and citrus fruits. As soon as the British colonial government started

asserting its authority over Somalia at the turn of the century, resistance took shape under

the leadership of Somali nationalist Sayyid Mohammed Abdille Hasan: known to the

British as "the Mad Mullah".13 His Islamic resistance movement sought to end European

rule and Ethiopian incursion in Somali territories. He used both religion and nationalism

to advance his cause and successfully united Northern Somali tribes against the

foreigners until his death in 1920. The use of force by British never produced a better

outcome, but Sayyid Mohammed won many followers, especially among his own clan.

He dared to suggest the possibility of a free and united Somalia. While British and Italian

colonies were vying for control of the Somali Peninsula during the World War II,

Somalis continued to mistrust and undermine the authority of their colonial rulers. As a

result, the first modern Somali political group was formed in 1943. The Somali Youth

League (SYL) articulated the need for national unity and, by extension, discouraged

division and feuding between clan-families. This new ideology worked; the SYL helped

Somalis realize that the only way to succeed and overcome colonial occupation was to

unite against it.14 Against a common rival, a national consciousness was beginning to

form. The political pressure also helped to improve lives: colonial rulers took steps for

economic development, better education, and healthcare for growing urban communities.

The SYL¡¯s main focus, of course, was to end colonial rule and liberate the nation from

foreign influence and domination. This did not happen overnight; however, the

organization succeeded well in easing ill-feelings between tribes and compromising the

14 M. I. Egal, Somalia: Nomadic Individualism and the Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, Jul., 1968),

220

15 B. Braine, Storm Clouds over the Horn of Africa. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International

Affairs, Oct., 1958), 437

clan system. The creation of a Somali state in 1960 could not have happened without this

foundation.15

CHAPTER 2

U.S. STRATEGIC INTEREST IN SOMALIA DURING THE COLD WAR ERA

The U.S. and Soviet Union in Somalia

U.S involvement in Africa was limited before World War II, with the exception of a few

commercial treaties signed with selected countries in West Africa. Generally speaking,

Washington was not interested in African affairs and voiced no real objection to

European domination of the continent. However, there was some attention to Africa

when, on January 18, 1918, President Woodrow Wilson offered his famous Fourteen

Points declaration to a Joint Session of Congress in which he spoke about the principle of

self-determination and governance.16 At that time, President Wilson wanted to counter

the German threat which had changed the American attitude toward European Colonies.

His stance had obvious implications for the millions of Africans subjected to foreign rule.

16 Paul Johnson, Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Nineties (New York:

HarperCollins,1991), 429

17 Ibid., 21

The Atlantic Charter, signed in 1941 by President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister

Winston Churchill, was another initiative to promote world peace by compromising

imperialism. Both leaders recognized the importance of colonial people¡¯s rights to self-

determination and self-governance.17 After World War II, the Soviet Union entered

world political affairs in opposing Western domination and imperialism. As a result, the

Western bloc became still more proactive in promoting democracy in the former colonial

countries.

World War II¡¯s end marked the beginning of de-colonization in Somalia in earnest. The

process was not always perfect. Upon Somali independence in 1960, British Somaliland

and Italian Somaliland united under one flag, yet colonial boundaries granted Ethiopia,

Kenya, and France control over territories in which ethnic Somalis make up the majority

of the general population. While these three countries remained allies of the United

States, the U.S did not want to sever relations with Somalia because of the Soviet threat

and strategic importance of Africa¡¯s Horn region. As a result, the U.S promised financial

and military aid to Somalia; however, the Soviet-led Eastern bloc also offered a similar

deal in pursuit of its geographic advantages. Thus, Somalia became a prize during the

Cold War; even President Kennedy recognized this development and met with Somali

Prime Minister Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke in 1962. However, the Soviet Union ultimately

offered what Somalia wanted most: more military hardware (the Russian military aid

agreement of 1963) to protect the Somali population in Kenya and Ethiopia.18 On

October 21, 1969, the armed forces, led by General Siad Barre, overthrew the civilian

regime (former democratically elected leader Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke was assassinated

by one of his own security guards during his visit in the drought-stricken area of the Las-

Anod Disrtict, in the northern part of Somalia). Quickly, the usurping government

adopted scientific socialism, nationalized all major private corporations, prohibited

political parties, and shut down the parliament. U.S influence in Somalia apparently

ended as Somalia and the Soviet signed a prestigious treaty of friendship.

18 I. M. Lewis, Modern History of Somalia (London: Westview Press 1988), 209

On November 1, 1969, General Siad Barre established the Supreme Revolutionary

Council (SRC). The organization announced its intention to fight and abolish tribalism

and nepotism, major obstacles to progress and growth in the nine years of civilian,

democratic government. The nation was in perpetual financial crisis and overly

dependent on foreign assistance to meet its operating budget. A majority of Somali

people welcomed the new military regime¡¯s promise to clean up the sort of corruption

that had been tolerated in the previous administration. Popular acceptance helped

facilitate Barre¡¯s initiatives like "Scientific Socialism" and the battle against tribalism,

thought to be the true cancer of Somali society. Indeed, an official government slogan

stated, "Tribalism divides where Socialism unites."19

19 I. M. Lewis, Modern History of Somalia (London: Westview Press 1988), 209

20 Metz, 119

The new government won the hearts and minds of the people by promoting a new self-

reliance and self-supporting mentality. This helped to encourage a national, rather than

clan, consciousness, for it lessened dependence on traditional clan lineage for survival.

The main dream for every Somali was to be unified, including those living under

Ethiopian and Kenyan rule. Over the first eight years of the Barre regime, the Soviet-

Somali relationship grew into a significant military alliance. The two countries signed an

agreement that brought Soviet military capabilities to Somalia. Numerous, sophisticated

Russian weapon systems appeared, including MiG-21 jet fighters, T-54 tanks, and SAM-

2 missile defense system.20 In return, the Soviets were allowed a base at the port of

Berbara port, near the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. From this strategic location, they could

counter United States military movement in the Middle East and North Africa and control

trade. A more sinister aspect of the agreement saw the Soviet Union¡¯s KGB training

Somalia¡¯s own secret police organization, the National Security Services (NSS), which

could detain people indefinitely for any manufactured allegation.21 The ambition of a

greater, stronger Somalia come to fruition when Siad Barre invaded Ethiopia to liberate

the ethnic-Somali Ogaden region in 1977.

Ironically, the 1977-8 Somalia-Ethiopian War, enabled by Soviet support, was the

severing point in the friendship between the Cold War nations. The Soviets elected to

support Ethiopia against the nationalistic plans of its audacious neighbors. The Somali

National Army lost the war when a full Eastern bloc (comprised of Cuba, East Germany,

Libya, South Yemen, the Soviet Union army) attached themselves to the Ethiopian cause.

Of course, Somalia was not doomed to float out at sea. In a polarized world, a Soviet

enemy was automatically the United States¡¯ friend. Here, Washington found an

opportunity to normalize relations with Mogadishu. It offered military equipment to

Somalia in order to counterbalance Soviet and Cuban support for Ethiopia. Somalia, built

by Soviet aid, joined the Western camp in 1978, thus verifying the old clich¨¦ that there

are "no permanent friends nor permanent enemies."

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21Metz, 188

During the Cold War, the United States had a definite history in its African Enterprise of

supporting ruthless dictators, who committed atrocities and violate the fundamental

human rights of their own citizens. It was only required that these thugs somehow suit

American interests. This policy has long compromised key principles of the

Constitution: due process of law, respect for individual freedom and human rights, free

and fair democratic elections, and a free market economy. Yet such opportunism remains

a fixture of American foreign policy. Somalia fits the trend. Despite Siad Barre¡¯s poor

human rights records and corrupt government, the United States provided him with the

economic aid to sustain his government and military aid to protect Somalia from

Ethiopia¡¯s hostile Marxist regime. Here, one of many American-Soviet proxy wars was

waged where mutually assured destruction prevented a direct clash. Like Zaire¡¯s

notorious Mobutu Sese Seko, Barre benefited handsomely from America¡¯s support and

blind eye (see Figure 3). His regime survived the 80s, receiving grants and flexible loans

from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), and food aid through

USAID22, which was distributed amongst camps and displaced communities, as a result

of a refugee flood from war-torn Ogeden region of Eastern Ethiopia. In return, the

United States received its strategic naval base at Berbera.

22 Graham Hancock, Lord of Poverty: The Freewheeling Lifestyles, Power, Prestige, and Corruption of the

Multibillion Dollar Aid Business. (London: Macmillan London Ltd., 1989), 24

Strategically speaking, this was a win-win situation between the two allies. However,

Barre¡¯s gloomy shadow lingered over American integrity. Here was an illegal dictator

who neither tolerated political opposition nor so much as attempted to compromise in

crafting solutions acceptable in all parties. Rather, he preferred to act as a thug, using

force to eliminate any clan-family sympathizing with the opposition. His military forces

committed unnecessary atrocities in central Somalia in particular, where they burnt

villages, slaughtered thousands of innocent people, and raped women. Barre was highly

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antithetical to what the United States was supposedly pursuing. It is no wonder that, in

mid 80s, a rising opposition movement demanded fair representation in the government.

When Barre ignored this element, the opposition armed itself as the insurgent Somali

National Movement (SNM), its aim simply to overthrow the Barre regime.23

¡¡

23 Ahmed I. Samatar, The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal? (London: Lynne Rienner,

1994), 118

FIGURE 3

Siad Barre sitting with Ronald Reagan. Courtesy Somali Embassy in Washington, D.C.

The SNM¡¯s guerrilla army briefly seized two major cities in Northern Somalia ¨C Hargeisa

and Buro ¨C in 1988. Barre and his superior American weapons reacted by emphatically

crushing the SNM movement. He essentially leveled the rebel cities.24 Many civilians

died in the crossfire; thousands more fled their homes for the countryside, where water

and shelter were short.

24 Anna Simons, Somalia and the Dissolution of the Nation-State (American Anthropologist, New Series,

Vol. 96, No. 4, Dec., 1994), 823

25 Scott Peterson, Me Against my Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda (London: Routledge,

2000), 15

26 Samatar, 121

When the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991, so too did the polarization of the world.

The United States no longer had any real need for Somalia. It was now convenient to

withdraw the support that had long enabled Barre¡¯s rule and the illegalities that

characterized it. When the United States suspended all financial aid to the Barre¡¯s

regime, his security apparatus swiftly collapsed. Sensing the regime¡¯s vulnerability, rebel

forces ¨C taking the form of the United Somali Congress (USC) ¨C led by Mohamed Farah

Aideed stormed Mogadishu. Barre fled the capital in January, 1991.25 With the shared

enemy eliminated, so too did any reason for the resistance movement to be unified. The

same warlords who brought down the dictator continued to fight among themselves for

power and control; thus regional, clan politics returned to Somalia at the worst possible

time.26

The United States neglected its former Cold War ally until the September 11, 2001

terrorist attacks. Now, embroiled in another global conflict, the United States found new

strategic interest in Somalia and the Horn of Africa. This time, aid was offered to Somali

warlords and former Somali rival, Ethiopia, to fight America¡¯s proxy war. President

George Bush announced that Ethiopia could serve as an important strategic ally against

international terror networking. Therefore, in 2005, he oversaw a $450 million donation

in food aid, engineered by the U.S. Agency for International Development.

The Rise of Warlord Phenomenon in Somalia

The warlord phenomenon started soon after the collapse of the central government in

Somalia in 1991. This was the era of the United Somali Congress (USC) rebel

movement, characterized by much unfortunate chaos and violence. When USC

leadership (predominately from the Hawiye tribe) could not reconcile its political

differences, it descended into infighting which took the form of outright war, given that

the USC was, in fact, a tribal militia at heart. This struggle had two sides: one side was

loyal to self-appointed president Ali Mahdi Mohammed and the other side to General

Mohamed Farah Aideed. For a year the power struggle afflicted the Somali people with

loss of lives and property. The two men¡¯s quarrel became everyone¡¯s problem. Too

often, this is the case in modern-day Somalia. Neither leader could claim a decisive

victory or take control of government institutions. Consequently, peace and security in

the nation¡¯s capital were threatened.

These leaders were entrapped in Somali tradition. They exploited that tradition while

bearing the guise of modern diplomacy and tact. They effectively turned the struggle for

control of the USC into a fight for clan supremacy. The combatants recruited fighters

from their own clan-families and committed themselves to clan, rather than Somali nation

interests.

Aideed and Mahdi were vying for presidency of the entire nation. Although their

collaboration had already toppled the Siad Barre regime, they did not understand that

compromise worked. Now they had worked together to defeat a dictatorship: each settled

to become a local political leader of his respective clan-family in the hope he would

thereby control government institutions for the benefit of his own sector of the Somali

people. Interestingly, the two "candidates" were members of the same Hawiye tribe of

Mogadishu and central Somalia. Aideed belonged to Habar-Gidir sub-clan family, while

Mr. Mahdi was a member of the Abgal sub-clan. Thus, General Aideed and Mr. Mahdi

subdivided Hawiye tribe into two sub clans over which they presided as warlords. This development marked a "slippery slope" which was incompatible with the modern nation-state. Hence, "Warlordism" became an accepted part of Somali political culture. With so much threat from other clans, every major clan-family had to grow its military leaders and militias in order to protect itself. After all, the government itself was infested with warlords. So there was little protection ¨C let alone examples of good state governance ¨C coming from the Somali State Capital.

In summary, while clan elders and chiefs were still responsible for clan family affairs in villages, warlords were the players upon the national stage. They kept away from clan business which might create conflicts with traditional elders and chiefs. The warlords

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concerned themselves with warfare; they knew no other way of getting things done. In effect, they were ¨C and still are ¨C Somalia¡¯s nightmare, an unending plague.

U.S. Support for Somali Warlords

The United States reevaluated its foreign policy following the Soviet collapse and the subsequent end of the Cold War. Somalia marked one of the changes. Since there was no longer significant strategic importance to the Horn region of Africa, the U.S. ended all economic and military aid to Siad Barre¡¯s regime, leaving him with no leg to stand on.

Encouraged, insurgents rose to armed struggle against the demoralized and poorly equipped national army. Suddenly, Barre¡¯s government resembled a pushover. It quickly ceased to existed, but the transition was less than ideal. Somalia went from one to many rulers; already in battle mode, warlords took to fighting each other where there was no Barre to unite against. Thus, anarchy replaced law and order. Somali went back to traditional clan warfare. This sort of chaos was part of the old, nomadic culture but hardly compatible with the requirements of a modern nation state. The clan-family system and its culture of violence took its toll. Major clan-families aligned themselves behind warlords. All seeking protection of their own interests and territories, they wound up infringing heavily upon each other, fueling a prolonged civil war in the country.

Countless innocent people lost their lives because of the fighting. More severe, however, was the starvation it left in its wake. 1992 saw a historic famine. A full quarter of Somalia¡¯s nine-million people experienced malnourishment. Here, conscience got the better of the United States and international community. The United Nations took up a

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humanitarian intervention geared at getting help to starving people in the countryside.

This was easier said than done. It quickly became apparent that the United States could

not aid Somalia without embroiling itself in the civil war. Warlords were blocking

United Nations¡¯ aid shipments from reaching people in need. President George H. W.

Bush¡¯s administration introduced a new initiative called "Operation Restore Hope"

before it left office in late 1992. This effort saw the United States partner with United

Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali in the deployment of 30,000-strong

peacekeeping force to oversee safe and effective delivery of humanitarian food to the

starving people. President Bush went to the town of Baida, which the media had dubbed

"City of Death," to witness what the effort was accomplishing ¨C and exactly what it was

up against.

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Bill Clinton replaced George H.W. Bush in office in 1993. He continued, and in fact

expanded, his predecessor¡¯s involvement in Somalia. Now the humanitarian mission

started to turn into a political and nation-building effort.27. However, in pursuit of the

best government, U.N. and U.S. officials actually helped to exacerbate strife by pitting

one warlord against another. One prime example was when Belgian peacekeepers

enabled warlord Mohamed Said Morgan to capture the southern Somali town of Kismayo

from General Mohamed Farah Aideed¡¯s ally, Mohamed Omar Jess.28 This action

infuriated Aideed and his followers (see Figure 4). Many violent protests ensued against

U.N. humanitarian efforts, involving road bombs and skirmishes with Pakistani

27 Craig Unger, The Fall of the House of Bush: House of Bush, House of Saud. (New York: Simon &

Schuster, 2007), 176

28 Peterson, 65

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peacekeepers.

FIGURE 4

General Mohamed Farah Aideed29. Courtesy Hobyo.net

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29 Aideed¡¯s photo was retrieved from http//www.hobyo.net

Here, U.S. policy completed its transformation from a humanitarian to military mission

and ordered the arrest of General Aideed. This mistake shows the extent to which the

United States failed to understand the culture and the clan politics of this nomadic nation.

Admittedly, Aideed was a ruthless thug and a poor model for humanity; yet when U.S.

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and U.N coalition started to hunt him down, he became an automatic hero for Somalis

because of his wiliness to stand up to the world¡¯s remaining superpower. As mentioned

before, there has always been conflict among tribes; however, as soon as a foreign threat

manifests itself, old clan rivalries give way to unity against the common threat. The

clans, after all, are separate pieces of one shared, regional culture; here is where they

become Somali.

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Aideed mobilized Somalia¡¯s clans, including rivals, against the foreigners. In response,

the United States and United Nations escalated the conflict. This led to eighteen

American servicemen losing their lives and the infamous shooting down of two Black

Hawk helicopters.30 The nation-building effort never succeeded because of

misunderstanding of Somali culture and misguided foreign policy based on unnecessary

use of force rather than political resolution. The war became an embarrassment to the

Clinton administration especially, particularly when images surfaced of an American

serviceman being dragged through the street of Mogadishu. This was about enough.

President Clinton admitted the failed U.S. policy toward Somalia and announced that he

was bringing forces home.31 In 1994, U.S. and international forces left Somalia, having

been defeated by militias a few-hundred strong.

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30 Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War. (New York: Penguin, 2000), 90

31 Richard Clarke, Your Government Failed You: Breaking the Cycle of National Security Disasters. (New

York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2008), 35

Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin-Laden missed no time in claiming responsibility for the U.S.

defeat in Somalia. The Saudi terrorist leader said that he had provided Somali militants

with the sophisticated air-missiles that had shot down the two Black Hawk helicopters.

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He insisted that U.S. Army had no backbone to fight and die in such wars.32. He

threatened to continue his own struggle until United States interests all over the world

were in ruins. Thus, the new threat of Islamic radicalism effectively replaced fifty years

of Cold War. This, however, was a different kind of enemy.

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32 Dinesh D¡¯Souza, The Enemy at Home: The Culture Left and Its Responsibility for 9/11. (New York:

Random House, 2007), 213

33 Mathew Blood, "The U.S. Role in Somali¡¯s Misery"; available from

http://www.greenleft.org.au/2008/778/39996; Internet; accessed 25 November 2008

34 Ken Menkhaus, State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts (Review of African Political Economy, Vol.

30, No. 97, The Horn of Conflict, Sep., 2003), 406

Somalia always has been a strategic location, but the U.S. effectively neglected it

between Clinton¡¯s 1994 pullout and the advent of the War on Terrorism in 2001.

Washington feared the impact of terrorism growing all around the world,33 particularly in

failed states such as Somalia and Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda threatened more than once that

they would bring their jihad against the U.S. and its regional ally, Ethiopia. In response,

Washington committed another foreign policy blunder. As allies, it solicited none other

than the Somali warlords who had effectively feudalized and starved the country. Thus,

against its policy and ideals, the United States effectively legitimized their reign of terror.

In the process of continued feuding for control of territories, warlords established two

semi-autonomous governments: Somaliland in the northwest and Puntland in the

northeast of Somalia. Southern Somalia, including Mogadishu and Kismayo, were still

lawless ¨C ravaged by clan warfare and mired in destruction and starvation.34 American¡¯s

primary goal was to partner any allies in support of the War on Terrorism in the Horn

region.

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George W. Bush came to Oval Office promoting "compassionate conservatism."35 His

balanced, humble foreign policy outlook quickly changed following the September 11,

2001 terrorist attacks. Starting in December 2001, President Bush decided to expand

U.S. involvement in the Horn of Africa once again. He declared Ethiopia to be the

principal regional ally against terrorism. Just as Somalia benefited from U.S. economic

aid during the Cold War because of its strategic location, its neighbor (Ethiopia) now

emerged as favored nation, benefitting from aid from the U.S. Agency for International

Development. Thus, Ethiopian government and Somali warlords were sought to hunt and

neutralize suspected terrorists hiding in the region.

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35 David Frum, The Right Man: The Surprise Presidency of George W. Bush (New York: Random House,

2003), 5

36 John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen, "Blowing the Horn". International Crisis Group ¨C Foreign

Affairs. (March/April 2007). Retrieved from www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4679

In Somalia, Washington endeavored to build a new association: The Alliance for

Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism. This was comprised of regional warlords.

The United States paid each $150,000 per month for his cooperation.36 This type of

unilateral action severely undermined the new transitional government by further

legitimizing states within a state and, effectively, feudalism. This is not what Somalia

needed; the President of Somali government, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed (who, like some of

his ministers, had past lives as a warlord) continually reiterated the need for U.S.

political, military, and humanitarian aid for his weak government. The American policy

failed, as the Somali people rejected the coalition between violent warlords and Ethiopia.

The former only brought lawlessness and instability; the latter was opportunistic at best,

and more likely a prospective colonist. It is no surprise, then, that when conflict started

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between U.S. backed warlords and Islamic Court Union (ICU), the majority of Somalis

supported the ICU ¨C seen to be the only real hope for a peaceful Somalia.

Washington¡¯s policy, already a failure, only escalated the crises by labeling the ICU as

extremist and soliciting Ethiopia, a major recipient of American arms since the Cold War

ended, to deal with the ICU in a sort of proxy war in the grander scheme of the War on

Terror. Of course, U.S. officials declined to directly address the question of backing for

Somali warlords, who styled themselves as a counterterrorism coalition in pursuit of

continued American support. For instance, State Department spokesman Sean

McCormack vaguely told reporters:

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"The United States would work with responsible individuals . . . in fighting terror.

It's a real concern of ours ¨C terror taking root in the Horn of Africa. We don't want

to see another safe haven for terrorists created. Our interest is purely in seeing

Somalia achieve a better day."37

37 Emily Wax and Karen DeYoung, "US Secretly Backing Warlords in Somalia", Washington Post

17 May, 2006, sec. A01

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The United States¡¯ gamble on the warlords failed when the increasingly well-supported

ICU crushed them. The Islamic organization took control Mogadishu and most of

southern Somalia. Now, in a disastrous blow to U.S. anti-terrorism initiative as a whole,

it revealed its Islamist character. This included the introduction of a harshly-interpreted

Sharia which punished all outlaws, prohibited the consumption of alcohol and use of

stimulant khat, required women to wear veils, and banned movies and televised World

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Cup soccer games on television. The ICU brand of Islam might have been an

abomination in better times, however most people saw no better choice. The United

States failed to internalize just how unsecure Somalia had become, when it chose to

support the warlords who had caused this problem. As a reward, it now had an incredibly

hostile governing body to deal with. With the ICU effectively in power, the country¡¯s

new, weak transitional government has been operating largely out of neighboring Kenya

and the southern city of Baidoa. Most of Somalia was in anarchy, ruled by a patchwork of

competing warlords; the capital was too unsafe for even Prime Minister Ali Muhammad

Ghedi to visit. He described U.S. officials¡¯ involvement in the conflict between Somali

warlords and ICU as dangerous and shortsighted, arguing that this was undermining his

government:

"We would prefer that the U.S. work with the transitional government and not

with criminals. This is a dangerous game. Somalia is not a stable place and we

want the U.S. in Somalia. But in a more constructive way. Clearly we have a

common objective to stabilize Somalia, but the U.S. is using the wrong

channels."38

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38 Emily Wax and Karen DeYoung, "US Secretly Backing Warlords in Somalia", Washington Post

17 May, 2006, sec. A01

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CHAPTER 3

GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR ¨C POST 9/11

The Rise of Islamic Movement in Horn of Africa

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It has already been seen that, after the fall of Said Barre in 1991, opportunistic warlords

effectively feudalized Somalia back into a dark age. Their bands ravaged the country

amidst uncontrollable civil war, as they battled for strategic towns and regional footholds.

Anyone who could piece together an army or militia could obtain a piece of Somalia.

Accordingly, a group of northeastern Islamists wasted no time in grabbing Garowe Town

in 1992. While the majority of the Somali population is Muslim (99%, predominantly

Sunni), the nation had long sustained itself without a theocratic thrust. Religious leaders

have always been respected and honored for their knowledge of the Islam, yet the Somali

culture traditionally draws a line between their realm and those of state, government, and

clan. Generally, clerics have neither sought to influence clan politics nor claim any

particular leadership position other than that of teacher.39

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39 Metz, 97

Over the centuries, Somalia pastoral society perpetuated its own Islamic tradition.

Fundamentalism held little appeal for it. Clan society saw only harm in strict Salafist

ideas. Particularly abrasive among these were rigid Sharia law and new, rank-and-file

leadership which could only confront and undermine the time-honored clan system. That

is why pastoral Somalia had rejected Islamist militant fervor in the past. It saw instability

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rather than tranquility in the usurpation of power from the most basic social units. It was

not easy for the phenomenon of hard-line Islamism to survive in the Somali nomadic

society without the support of clan leaders, not to mention the common people as an

entirety. However, fundamentalism ¨C based in sources to which no one could answer (i.e.

the Koran) ¨C was equally hard to squelch entirely. Like a parasite, it would always find a

way to breed and perpetuate its kind. The Islamist part of Somali society and its

leadership came from different tribes and regions. However, a single goal unified all of

the elements: to rule the land under Islamic law. The movement was effectively against

all of Somali history. Often construed as antiquated, fundamentalists actually think

themselves progressive. The Somali version believed that the ancient clan system was

un-Islamic and in need not of realignment, but abolition. This idea was brash and radical.

Its fate in Garowe Town suggests a basic rift with the Somali people and time. The clan

system brought down the fundamentalists when northeastern communities learned that

the group¡¯s principal leader, Sheikh Hasan Dahir Aways (future head of the Islamic Court

Union), was a member of Hawiye tribe which belongs to same clan as General Mohamed

Farah Aideed. Aideed had achieved infamy as the notorious warlord who led the rebel

USC in overthrowing Siad Barre¡¯s government and instigating genocide against the

Darood clan in the south. Many of the victims fled from their homes in Mogadishu for

refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia.

Well-known African Horn historian Said Samatar described the relationship between

Islam and Somali tribal tradition as follows:

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"Somalia will never be a breeding ground for Islamic terrorism" the main reason

being, the Somali politics shaped as it is "to an extraordinary degree, by a central

principle that overrides all others, namely the phenomenon that social

anthropologists refer to as the segmentary lineage system"40

Exploring the phenomenon further, Samatar agreed with what Professor Cassanelli

argued about the systematic division among Somali society:

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40 Samatar, 1992: 629

41 Ibid., 629

"My uterine brother and I against my half brother, my brother and I against my

father, my father's household against my uncle's household, our two households,

against the rest of the immediate kin, the immediate kin against non-immediate

members of my clan, my clan against others and, finally, my nation and I against

the world."41

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Accordingly, Islamist leaders often lost the battle between religious and clan loyalty.

This was the precise fate of the northeastern Islamists in Garowe Town. Sheikh Aweys

looked outside of his clan to establish and recruit an Islamic militia. He failed. Local

tribal leaders and residents defined him as an outsider and enemy of the Darood who

wanted to unmake the peace that they had enjoyed since the collapse of central

government. When Aweys and his followers lost the support of the people, clan warlord

and future Somali president Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed mobilized his militia to oust the

Islamists from Gorowe and the region. That is the best example of the old clan system

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overpowering the incursion of hard-line Islamic ideas.

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However, it was just as difficult to destroy radical Islamism as it was to defeat the clan

system. The movement did not die; rather, it changed its strategy and point of attack to

the southern regions where there was far more violence, chaos, and anarchy to exploit.

For several years, the Islamists went underground and quietly reorganized under the

radar. Then, in 1996, they announced a new organization called Al-Itahad al-Islamiya,

based in Gedo in the southwest, near the Ethiopian and Kenyan borders.42 Here, warlords

and tribal leaders had only a very loose handle. Al-Itahad al-Islamiya perceived a power

vacuum and sought to take advantage of it. Sheikh Dahir Aweys, previously defeated by

northeastern warlord Abdulahi Yusuf Ahmed in1992, resurfaced as the organization¡¯s

leader.43 The radicals started to collect weapons and impose Sharia on locals without

clan leaders¡¯ assent. Before long, Al-Itahad al-Islamiya had placed its own regional and

town administrators in direct opposition to existing clan leadership. With the menace

growing ever more foreboding, local leaders tried to negotiate with the Islamists, advising

them to lay their weapons down and resume peaceful teaching duties instead. The

militant group rejected the offer and killed some influential members of the clan-family

to assert that they were serious. During the negotiations, clan leaders encountered

Islamist¡¯s logic and reasoning were beyond their comprehension, because their rivals

sincerely believed that they did not have any ulterior motives except God¡¯s work on earth

and to apply His words to all people and society.

42 Andre Le Sage, Prospects for Al Itihad & Islamist Radicalism in Somalia. (Review of African Political

Economy, Vol. 28, No. 89,: Taylor & Francis, 2001), 473

43 Chris Tomlinson. "Target of Somalia air strike was one of the FBI¡¯s most wanted." The Independent. 9

January, 2007.

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A long debate ensued as the southern Somali clan base sought an appropriate course of

action. Mareehaan - Darood warlord Omar Haji Mohamed, former Defense Minister

helped steer the discussion toward Ethiopia. It was decided to seek military assistance.

Now Sheikh Aweys made another mistake by operating outside of his Hawiye clan¡¯s

territory. Combined Ethiopian and native forces proceeded to defeat the Islamists in the

Gedo region. Al-Itahad al-Islamiya was essentially nullified as a threat to southern

Somalia. Twice-defeated, Aweys and the remnants of his militia retreated to Mogadishu,

where his Hawiye clan dominates. It could no longer wage war against any clan militia

near the Somali-Ethiopian border.

The Islamists were neutralized, but all was not well. Old problems continued to afflict

Somalia. As before, warlords fought one another for territory, and United States

maintained its distance from the Somali people, who had suffered a decade of senseless

war and drought which had forced many into refugee camps inside and outside of the

country. Somalia was no longer a country, in truth. It was split into mini-states

controlled by clan leaders concerned far more with their fiefdoms than national unity

government. Puntland was established as an autonomous region in the northeast, while

the northwest proclaimed its independence as the Somaliland Republic. The south

remained lawless and violent. The region¡¯s deprivation enabled Islamic clerics to make a

comeback as bearers of order and peace. Indeed, the creation of a new Islamic court

system made good on its promise. The clerics brought some justice to Mogadishu. They

addressed many tough issues, including real estate and other civil disputes around which

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clan warfare had revolved. Mogadishu, at least, saw a drop in clan feuds and criminal

activities.44 As a result of this, the Hawiye clan-family, which had suffered greatly at the

hands of warlords, grew to support the Islamic clerics as a possible check to harmful

warlords¡¯ influence within the clan-family. The clerics¡¯ potential for stabilization was

apparent, insofar as their main goal was to advance and protect the interests of the tribe.

Unfortunately, Islamic extremism has shown again and again that this is too much to

hope for. While Islamic clerics committed themselves to community service and fair

judgment by law, they had bigger agenda than their own local clan in mind: to introduce

Sharia and to rule first Mogadishu and then all of Somalia by Islamic law. With the full

support of their clan-family and its leaders, the clerics had an opportunity to organize

former Al-Itihad al-Islamiya members and sympathizers into a court militia, charged with

enforcing rulings and arrest runaway criminals. The arming of the court gave it enormous

autonomy and justification, bordering on martial law. In 2006, Islamic clerics and

businesspeople progressed further in forming a new political organization called the

Islamic Court Union (ICU) to unite all smaller Islamic groups. Electing 90 assembly

members helped legitimize the Islamist interest. As president, they elected none other

than former Al-Itihad al-Islamiya leader Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. Aweys had twice

failed in efforts to Islamize large chunks of Somalia. Now, with a political apparatus and

established court behind him, he once again pushed into the south.

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44 D. Ignatius, "Ethiopia¡¯s Iraq. Washington Post," 13 May 2007 , sec. B07

Since Somalia was classified as failed state and had lost its territorial integrity soon after

the collapse of central government fifteen years earlier, the Bush administration

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overreacted to this new development by employing warlords to fight an American proxy

war under the heading of the War on Terrorism. Bush declared Somalia a potential

"haven of terrorism"; there was, in truth, a precedent to back this opinion. Al-Qaeda and

non-state actors favor a lawless and anarchic environment where they can conduct

training, operate their financial and communication networks, and plan targets relatively

freely. In Somalia as well as Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda recruited from the local population

and preached openly its opportunistic "destroy-and-kill" philosophy. The indoctrination

and manipulation of young, disenchanted Muslim men has been an effective a strategy.

Peace-loving people around the world have been materially and morally robbed ¨C too

often of life itself. Osama bin Laden¡¯s al-Qaeda deserves the greatest condemnation for

its barbaric actions and needs to be eliminated as an entity by any means possible.

However, it remains the case that Somalia is not the same situation as Afghanistan. Here

again, as with Iraq, the Bush administration automatically associated trouble and

unfavorable circumstances in a Muslim country with al-Qaeda and terrorism. The U.S.

branded the ICU without learning about the complex relationships between Islamic

clerics within the ICU organization. In reality the organization, like Islam itself, is very

multifaceted. Besides the different factions loyal to specific ethnic groups, ICU militants

and clerics pursued and advocated different varieties of Islam. These include but are not

limited to traditionalist, Brotherhood, Salafist, Islamist, and Jihadist Muslim. Washington

missed a great opportunity to recognize these differences and choose its words, actions,

and judgments accordingly. By branding the entire ICU as "terrorist," the U.S. alienated

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Somali Muslims in general and forged a much greater enemy in the process.45

Thus, unwelcome American incursion only helped to encourage the ICU¡¯s rise to power.

Three factors behind its rise were:

1.) Violent turmoil and lawlessness which killed many Somalis and denied many

more the right and ability to work and feed themselves.

2) Lack of international support in addressing the need for national reconciliation

in forming an inclusive, credible government.

3) The United States and its Ethiopia ally rushing to judgment in characterizing

all devoted Somali Muslims as radical Jihadists in need of destruction.

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45 Anna Shoup, "U.S. Involvement in Somalia"; available from

www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/africa/somalia/usinvolvementinsomalia; Internet; access 24

November 2008

Washington, in failing to understand the importance of the above issues, missed an

opportunity to better its international image and Somalia. Addressing the ICU with care

¨C via diplomacy and international consensus building ¨C might have gone a long way in

easing the United States¡¯ reputation for stereotyping and not quite trying to understand

Muslims (or worse, being their enemy). The Islamic world and Africa might have been

well-involved in a concerted effort to stabilize Somali. Instead, the U.S. went the route

of facilitating more war in a war-torn nation. By financing Ethiopia and Somali warlords

in their fight against the Islamists, Washington was perceived by Somalis not as the

solution, but part of the problem. In fact, the underhanded maneuvering of Kenyan-based

CIA operatives made the extremists more popular, boosting their image as righteous

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warriors among radicals and traditionalists alike. It is probably not coincidental,

therefore, that before Mogadishu fell into the hands of the ICU and imposed a strict

interpretation of Sharia law. Washington was alarmed; it would seem that Somalia had

acquired its own Taliban.46

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46 Burkheman, O. (2006, June 10). Fall of Mogadishu Leaves U.S. Policy in Ruins. Guardian, pp.A4

47 Ibid, pp.A5

Somali expert and associate professor of political science at Davidson College in North

Carolina, Ken Menkhaus, lamented the consequences of the turn in U.S. Somali policy: "

This is worse than the worst-case scenarios ¨C the exact opposite of what the US

government strategy, if there was one, would have wanted". 47 Washington, in many

ways, made its own bed; now it will have to lie in it. It had paid little attention to a

decade-long humanitarian crisis, anarchy, and lawlessness. To this day, the U.S. State

Department Bureau of African Affairs webpage does not even include Somalia as a

trouble spot in sub-Saharan Africa in need of help and attention. In short, the U.S. has no

inherent political and economic interest in Somalia which requires it to intervene for

peace and stability. However, as the second Islamic radicalism comes to the fore, the

U.S. shifts its policy and pursues a quick-fix marred war and a further exacerbation of the

crisis. All of this begs a very good question: Is the United States really involved in

Somalia for Somalia¡¯s sake, or for its own?

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The United States¡¯ dilemma grew and contracted some additional urgency when Al-

Itahad al-Islamiya leader Sheikh Aweys took control the ICU organization. Naturally,

Al-Itahad al-Islamiya was added to the list of al-Qaeda-linked terrorist organizations.

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The Ethiopian government had accused Aweys¡¯ group of involvement in a series of

bombing in Ethiopia. During a congressional hearing, Jendayi Frazer, Assistant

Secretary for African Affairs, told lawmakers that the U.S. would monitor the situation

and coordinate a response through a new body called the Contact Group. The Contact

Group consists of the African Union (AU), United Nations (UN), European Union (EU),

United States, Sweden, Norway, Italy, Tanzania, and others. Frazer explained the ICU

takeover of Mogadishu and other southern towns as an extension of al-Qaeda operations:

"The U.S. government remains deeply troubled by the foreign-born terrorists who have

found safe haven in Somalia in recent years."48

The U.S. drafted a U.N. resolution that authorized the African Union (AU) to intervene in

Somalia and asked the international community to finance this effort. On December 6,

2006, the Security Council passed resolution number 1725. Predictably, the Ethiopian

army, with complicit U.S. backing, rushed in to protect the United Nations-sponsored

Transitional Federal Government (TFG), based in Baidoa, a small town