S E C R E T / / NOFORN / / 20330901

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO

U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA

APO AE 09360

JTF-GTMO-CDR 1 September 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 9lst Avenue,

Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for

Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SO-000567DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1.(S//NF) Personal Information: ·JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Mohammed Soliman

Barre

·Current/True Name and Aliases: Muhammad Sulayman

Barre, Abu Yusuf al-Somali, Abu Ahmad, Maxed Saleban

Barre, Khalil, Mohd Soliman Barre, Maxed Suleyman,

Abdullah al-Somali, Muhammad al-Somali

·Place of Birth: Burco, Somalia (SO)

·Date of Birth:27 December 1964

·Citizenship:Somalia

·Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SO-000567DP

2.(U//FOUO)Health: Detainee is in overall good health.

3.(U)JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a.(S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for CD on 7

September 2007.

b.(S//NF) Executive Summary: If released without rehabilitation, supervision, and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law abiding citizen, it is assessed detainee would seek out prior associates and reengage in hostilities and extremist supportactivities. Since transfer to JTF-GTMO, detainee has provided conflicting information and withheld information of intelligence value and has instructed other detainees in extremist

CLASSIFIED BY:MULTIPLE SOURCES

REASON:E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)

DECLASSIFY ON:20330901

views. Detainee is assessed to be a member of al-Qaida and al-Qaida affiliated groups, a financier, and facilitator in the Global Jihad Support Network (GJSN).¹He is a veteran extremist and a probable associate of Usama Bin Laden (UBL) dating back to 1992. Detainee provided direct financial support to al-Qaida, al-Wafa, and other terrorist andterrorist support entities through the Somalia-based company Dahabshiil hawala.² Detaineeis assessed to have directly arranged a large transfer of funds prior to his capture, which was used to finance the 28 November 2002 al-Qaida attacks in Mombasa, Kenya (KE). Detaineewas in contact with other Somalis possibly linked to al-Qaida who were living in the US and who may have been involved in terrorist financing operations.Detainee received advanced training in mortars and artillery at al-Qaida’s al-Faruq Jihad Wahl Training Camp in 1992, prior to fighting in the Afghan Civil War, and possibly worked on the staff at the al-Qaida affiliated Islamic Institute in Kandahar, Afghanistan (AF). JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

HIGH risk, as he is likely to

·A pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies

·A HIGH threat from a detention perspective

·Of HIGHintelligence value

c.(S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee’s assessment since the last JTF-GTMO assessment. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by next to the footnote.)

3

·Added alias Muhammad al-Somali

1

Analyst Note:The GJSN is a National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) counterterrorism (CT) priority 1 target. Priority 1 targets are issues, opportunities, or threats that rise to, or are expected to rise to, the level of interest of the President, Vice President, DNI, and NSC/HSC Principals and Deputies.This includes terrorist groups that pose a clear and immediate danger to US persons or interests. The GJSN is composed of individuals mostly from North Africa, the Levant, or Saudi Arabia who reside in those countries or in Europe or South Asia. The network provides various services including logistics and fundraising, and helps move operatives from country to

country as needed.

2

Analyst Note:Hawala is a remittance system and association of businesses that transfer money based on

traditional Islamic custom, without regulatory control or government oversight. Hawalas generally move money within a framework of tribal trust and loyalties. Somalia-based organizations rely on hawalas for the majority of their monetary transactions, and terrorist organizations worldwide utilize hawalas for their security as well as their privacy. For example reporting, see 10011 Finance Network-DIA Assessment 06-JAN-2002, 9-11 Commission - Terrorist Financing, PACOM JIOC IB LT Financial Network 22-Nov-2007, DIA Dynamic Threat Assessment 1-

Apr-2004, and US Money Laundering Threat Assessment 1-Dec-2005. The non-governmental organization al-Wafa, aka (Wafa al-Igatha al-Islamia), is an NIPF CT priority 3 Terrorist Support Entity (TSE). Priority 3 TSE have demonstrated intent and willingness to provide financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack US

persons or interests, or provide witting operational support to Priority 1-2 terrorist groups.

000704 SIR 23-FEB-2007

·Incorporated reporting that detainee and his father-in-law were members of the

Osman Group

4.(U) Detainee’s Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee’s own account.

These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.

a.(S//NF) Prior History: After finishing primary and secondary school in Burco, detainee served his mandatory government conscription as a military guard in a refugee camp near Marka, SO.Detainee graduated from Somalia University in Mogadishu, SO in 1989 with a degree in agriculture. Detainee then worked with his father in the animal export business.⁴

b.(S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: In 1994, detainee moved from Somalia to Pakistan (PK) to find work. He had difficulty obtaining a visa, so he first went to India, where he attempted to obtain United Nations (UN) refugee status.He was denied UN refugee status inIndia, but he obtained a visa to travel to Pakistan under the sponsorship of Jamaat Tablighi

(JT).⁵ Detainee stated he had no intention of performing missionary duties or serving with the JT; he just used the group to get a visa. In 1995, upon on arrival in Pakistan, detainee obtained UN refugee status.⁶

c.(S//NF) Training and Activities: From 1995 to 1998, detainee worked as a translator and escort for Somali businessmen visiting Karachi, PK.⁷In August 1998, detainee’s distantrelative Muhammad Mussa asked detainee to establish a branch office in Karachi for the Somalia-based company Dahabshiil.⁸ Detainee accepted the offer and was given $10,000

US from the Dubai, United Arab Emirates (AE) office of Dahabshiil to start the new branch.

Detainee operated the branch illegally as he never procured a business license or paid taxes.

Detainee operated the office from his residence and maintained business and customer contacts through Internet cafes and public e-mail domains.⁹