Mahiga's posting to Somalia as SRSG offered him the best of both worlds: to be based in Nairobi and be part of its international and diplomatic high society and yet to be so close to his home town, Dar Es Salaam. Otherwise, his exposure to Somalia, the country to which he is technically assigned, is limited to rare fleeting appearances at Mogadishu airport where he would meet his Somali counterparts in the TFG. Much as he is another failed SRSG despite his appearances to the contrary, Somalis nonetheless had tolerated his shortcomings until now for the simple reason that he was not better or worse than his predecessors. The fact that he is from a country in the region (Tanzania) for which Somalis hold much empathy was hitherto in his favour.

Mahiga has now done to Somalia what no other SRSG before him has done: call for the break-up of Somalia by advocating the recognition of Somaliland. This is precisely what he did on a visit to Hargeisa, the capital of the one-clan secessionist enclave, on December 4th, reportedly in the presence of IGAD officials and British diplomats based in Addis Ababa. This is an incomprehensible action from any Senior UN staff and more so from Mahiga whose trade mark is risk aversion that could in anyway upset his applecart.

Calling for the break-up of the very country he was supposed to revive and nourish its unity is contrary to his clear-cut mandate and could technically cost him his job. What he did is not an oversight or temporary lapse of judgement on his part. He knows that neither he nor the United Nations for that matter has any power to recognise Somaliland or any other country. That domain is the exclusive prerogative of sovereign member countries.

The question that arises is why the normally affable, innocuous and prudent Mahiga should take leave of his senses and embark on this risky gamble that in theory could anger the TFG and ask for his removal? A number of factors, singly or collectively, could explain Mahiga's action and calculations: First, those who follow Somaliland's relentless campaign to gain recognition and its readiness to bribe corrupt African leaders, including Somali ones, or officials heading regional organisations, such as the AU or IGAD, may rightly or wrongly conclude that Mahiga might have fallen for Somaliland's irresistible and lavish inducements. This perception, admittedly, is a long shot but it is also plausible. Mahiga after all is no saint. He is part of his African milieu where taking bribes by African presidents, government leaders and his own peers, is part of the prevailing African conventional wisdom.

What Mahiga has done is more likely to be at the behest of some countries who want him to serve as a Trojan horse to facilitate Somaliland's recognition on the understanding that he would be shielded from any punitive action from his boss, Ban ki Moon, and also from the TFG. The USA and EU member countries had in the past predicated their recognition of Somaliland on a prior lead from the AU and its member countries. Mahiga's call for Somaliland's' recognition could therefore be disingenuously construed by IGAD (and AU) members as getting the seal of approval from the horse's mouth and could therefore feel free to recognise Somaliland.

Mahiga knows that there is no way he could keep his post as SRSG for Somalia if an annoyed TFG would declare himpersona non grataor simply refuse to work with him. What therefore persuaded him and the countries pushing him was the knowledge that there would be no adverse backlash from the TFG, counting on its total indifference to Somalia's unity and their preoccupation with feathering their own nests as their departure from office draws inexorably closer. All the evidence of course supports Mahiga and his backers' calculations.

The complete absence of reaction from the entire TFG echelon, after several days since Mahiga made the call for Somaliland's recognition, comes on the heels of a TFG minister who recently advocated Somaliland's recognition without any reprimand from his bosses, let alone losing his job. The conclusions outsiders can reasonably draw are clear: first is the absence of a true Somali government despite the sham TFG claim to be the "internationally recognised government"; secondly, the TFG, far from defending Somalia's unity, may indeed be condoning its break-up willy-nilly. It is these facts which serve as incentives for outside interventions in Somalia, notably neighbouring countries, and also explain the treacherous betrayal of the UN's own country representative.

More ominously, Mahiga's call is not an isolated one-off affair. It is part of a concerted attack on Somalia in which neighbouring countries have been given the green light to invade it with western military, financial and intelligence support. The aim is not only the break-up of Somalia into its pre-independence constituent parts but also to carve up the south (former Italian Somaliland) into antagonistic Bantustans at loggerheads with one another and bonded to their respective protégés (Ethiopia and Kenya) and for all practical purposes beyond the jurisdiction of the central Somali government. Since in all probability a successor government to the TFG could turn out to be less pliant and accommodating, the break-up and balkanisation of Somalia would be accelerated and accomplished during the little time that is left for this dummy TFG.

As they say, man proposes and God disposes and things rarely ever work out the way foreigners plan Somalia to be. Somalis may have no government to run their affairs and defend their national interests but as people they have always been a hard nut to crack and more often than not defeated foreign intrigues on their country- witness the litany of failed foreign interventions in Somalia in the recent past. A similar outcome could await the latest aggressions against Somalia.

If Mahiga thought that his action will serve as magical wand ushering Somaliland's recognition, it shows how little he knows of the country and its people. Even if one discounts action by the TFG or its successor, all the unionist regions and clans in the north, apart from the one-clan secessionist enclave based in Hargeisa, are determined to remain part and parcel of Somalia and would defend tooth and nail their right to self-determination. They have formed, or are in the process of forming, their regional administrations that will be part of federal Somalia. There is no way the one-clan Somaliland authority can prevail over such determined and united opposition to their secession and hegemony.

What Mahiga and other supporters of Somaliland are doing is simply to revive the fortunes of Al Shabaab. Admittedly, they failed to draw much immediate windfall from these invasions unlike in the past. This is because most Somalis have come to detest them increasingly and saw little to choose between them and the invaders. But the longer the invasion persists and the suffering inflicted on the Somali population rises, the more many Somalis are likely to be driven into the arms of Al Shabaab. Its religious demagogy may be unpalatable but few doubt its patriotic credentials. And in a country with no credible government, that could in the end outweigh al Shabaab's other negative attributers.

Far from bringing peace and stability to Somalia in line with his mandate, Mahiga is spearheading the break-up and the balkanisation of Somalia. To save Somalia, Mahiga Must go Now. The TFG may not have the temerity to ask for this, but the voice of the wider Somali people at home and abroad must be raised loud and clear and in the end it is bound to be heard by Secretary-General Ban ki Moon. Secondly, it behoves all Somali nationalists across regions and clans to ensure that the next Somali government includes none of the current corrupt self-serving lot. Indeed, some of them may have committed treason and other crimes against the country in which case they should be tried when the time comes.

In the end, the choice for the secessionist backers boils down to whether the international community should recognise one clan in the north as an independent State. There is little to gain from this and Indeed the dire consequences it would usher, inside and outside Somalia, are too horrible to contemplate. No countries are more susceptible and prone to ethnic, religious and tribal divisions and turmoil than Somalia's neighbours. Their current invasions and interventions may succeed in temporarily rendering Somalia dyfunctional but not for ever. Sooner or relater Somali nationalsm and the aspirations for unity are bound to re-born with vigour and vengeance. All that these countries gain is to import to their own countries the very instability they are now visiting on Somalia. As they say, the chicken will come home to roost. Somalia could in the end have the last laugh.

Osman Hassan