Nairobi (Sunatimes) In recent weeks, some have started to question the scale of the tragedy unfolding in the Horn of Africa. In the UK, an essay in The Spectator claims that “‘Somalis’ are not starving. The victims are mainly the …minority clans”. An article published in last week’s edition of the EastAfrican suggests that aid agencies have been overstating the scale of the famine, citing a Nairobi-based agricultural economist who “believes that it is very likely that many parts of Somalia that have been declared as suffering from drought, such as the fertile Lower Shabelle region – which experienced a bumper harvest last year –may actually be food secure.”

The implication that the situation in Somalia is not as serious as has been reported, and that only a small proportion of the population is actually starving in areas where the United Nations has declared a famine, is not only untrue but unfortunately echoes statements by Al Qaeda-linked extremist insurgents that the crisis, which is mostly affecting areas under their control, is nothing but a figment of the “infidel” imagination. The emergency is real and has been years in the making. The Transitional Federal Government and UN agencies were appealing for help long before refugees begun to crowd into feeding centres in Mogadishu and in neighbouring countries.

Here are the facts. Somalia has two rain seasons. The long rains, known as Gu, start in March/April and last till June. The harvest is gathered from August at the tail end of a short dry spell, Xagaa. Deyr, the minor wet season, extends from October to November/December, with crops being harvested in February. The long dry season, Jiilaal, which starts in January, continues until the onset of the Gu.

While it is true that the 2010 Gu harvest was exceptional, it is important to note that Deyr harvests account for up to a third of total annual cereal production. Following the almost complete failure of the short rains last year, Deyr cereal production in southern Somalia plummeted to the lowest level since 1995, amounting to only 20 percent of the Post-War Average (PWA). Therefore, though the bumper Gu harvest was 137% of the PWA, the total production for the year was actually less than average.

Further, this year’s Gu was late and poorly distributed. In some parts of Shabelle, it hadn’t rained by early May. This led to hoarding of grain, causing a shortage in the market and driving prices up. In short, though cereal stocks from the 2010 Gu were still available in March, the Deyr harvest failure coupled with speculation had driven the price of food beyond the means of ordinary folk.

The UNHCR says that most of the displaced people heading to Mogadishu originate from Lower Shabelle, one of the most productive agricultural regions of Somalia. Some of these may well be returning families who had earlier been displaced by fighting in the capital, as the EastAfrican article speculates. However, given that many of the region’s farmers depend on rains because, according to the Shabelle Relief And Development Organization, irrigation facilities in the area are not functional, these are also extremely vulnerable drought.

The escalation into famine is wholly a result of the extremists’ actions. Farmers had been forced to grow cash crops to fund the insurgency, instead of food crops to feed their families. Children, youths and old men alike, were gang-pressed into insurgent ranks, diminishing the pool of labour available to tend to farms. Just weeks before the UN announced the famine in Lower Shabelle, the militants were reported to be stopping farmers watering their fields unless they paid an exorbitant fee. As the Spectator piece acknowledges, “[insurgent] forces looted grain stores, taxed food markets and menaced farmers until they gave up planting crops.” Amidst all this, they continue to prevent aid agencies from feeding the hungry and families from leaving the area to seek help.

The Spectator essay, however, makes a valid point. Food aid alone will not solve the situation in the long term. It must be accompanied by moves to resolve the conflict and to eradicate the extremist menace, which is the root cause of the famine. It is in recognition of this that the international community has been supporting the Somali peace and reconciliation process –a process rejected by insurgents who seek to perpetuate anarchy in the Horn and create a base from which to plot attacks against other countries in the region and across the globe.

The African Union Mission in Somalia is the spearhead of the international engagement. Its mandate is to protect the institutions generated by the peace process, train Somali security forces as well as facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid to the population. With its help, the Somali National Army (SNA) has created a zone of relative stability in Mogadishu to which the IDPs are flocking and where the government has been providing essential services -such as policing, road repairs, street lighting and garbage collection- and where, working with the international aid agencies, it is now delivering humanitarian supplies to those who need them. Somalia is extremely grateful for the sacrifice that fellow Africans are making on our behalf.

AMISOM and the SNA must be given the tools and support necessary to extend this zone to cover the rest of the country. The immediate deployment into Mogadishu of the extra 3,000 AU troops already authorized by the UN Security Council would be an important first step, enabling the two forces to secure the areas of the city recently vacated by the fleeing extremists. Going forward, the Council should urgently reconsider the AU’s request to raise AMISOM’s troop ceiling to 20,000 and to equip the mission with an air and maritime capability.

The current situation in Somalia, while grim, has presented a window of opportunity. Action now, to both provide emergency help and strengthen the forces of peace, will ensure that the spectre of famine is eradicated from our shores, fully justifying future scepticism over reports of starving multitudes.